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I. INTRODUCTION
The Year in Review contains brief summaries of selected decisions handed down in 2000 by the Alaska Supreme Court, the
Alaska Court of Appeals, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, and the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska. The
summaries focus on the substantive areas of the law addressed, the
statutes or common law principles interpreted, and the essence of
each of the holdings. Attorneys are advised not to rely upon the
information contained in this review without further reference to
the cases cited. Please note that memorandum decisions and unpublished opinions are not included in The Year in Review.
The opinions have been grouped according to general subject
matter rather than the nature of the underlying claims. The summaries are presented alphabetically in the following ten areas of
the law: administrative, business, civil procedure, constitutional,
criminal, employment, family, insurance, property, and tort.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In Akiak Native Community v. United States Postal Service,1
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
2
court’s summary judgment in favor of the U.S. Postal Service. The
plaintiffs, several Alaska Native communities, sued the U.S. Postal
Service, arguing that the latter’s plan to serve the communities by
hovercraft rather than by aircraft violated both the Coastal Zone
Management Act (“CZMA”) and the National Environmental
Copyright © 2001 by The Alaska Law Review. The Year in Review is also available on the Internet at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/18ALRYearinReview.
1. 213 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2000).
2. See id. at 1148.
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Policy Act (“NEPA”).3 Under CZMA, any development projects
in a coastal zone must be consistent “to the maximum extent prac4
ticable” with approved state management programs. The U.S.
Postal Service provided a “consistency determination” to the State,
5
which granted its approval. The court found that plaintiffs’ rea6
sons to enjoin the hovercraft project were not compelling. The
plaintiffs also argued that the U.S. Postal Service’s Environmental
Assessment, required under NEPA, failed to assess adequately the
7
risks of, or the alternatives to, the hovercraft plan. The court
found these claims unwarranted, holding that the Environmental
Assessment met all of the criteria required by NEPA, and thus af8
firmed the district court’s summary judgment.
9
In State v. Kalve, the court of appeals held that the Federal
Submerged Lands Act works as a concurrent regulation with state
10
regulations and does not grant exclusive federal control. The
court reversed the superior court’s decision to dismiss claims
against the defendant, Kalve, a fisherman charged with illegally
11
fishing in closed state waters. Kalve was provided a federal li12
cense that enabled him to fish in certain state waters. By emergency regulation, the State of Alaska prohibited certain types of
fishing in state waters and Kalve subsequently was cited for fishing
13
in these waters. The district court granted Kalve’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the “paramountcy doctrine” grants fed14
eral supremacy in state waters. The court of appeals reversed,
holding that the paramountcy doctrine does not apply since the
Federal Submerged Lands Act gives states control over certain territorial waters and “the authority to regulate natural resources
15
within those waters.” Additionally, the federal regulations were
16
“not intended to supplant applicable state regulations.”

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See id. at 1143.
Id. at 1144.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1145-46.
See id. at 1148.
9 P.3d 291 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
See id. at 294.
See id. at 292.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 294.
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In American International Group v. Uallen Carriere,17 the supreme court held that Alaska Statutes section 23.30.155(f) “imposes a continuing duty to satisfy the fourteen-day requirement
18
with tender of a negotiable instrument.” Carriere had requested a
stop payment on a workers’ compensation check underwritten by
19
American International Group (“AIG”). When AIG failed to
send a replacement check within fourteen days, Carriere filed a
claim for a twenty-five percent late payment penalty under Alaska
20
Statutes section 23.30.155(f). The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board denied his claim because the initial check had been
21
mailed on time. The superior court reversed the agency’s deci22
sion. On appeal, the supreme court upheld the superior court’s
decision, holding that, by requesting a stop payment on the initial
23
check, Carriere had reinstated the fourteen-day obligation. Further, the statute does not allow discretion for mailing the payment
24
within a “commercially reasonable” time.
In City of St. Mary’s v. St. Mary’s Native Corp.,25 the supreme
court held that a city council could repeal an exemption to a voter26
approved sales tax without resubmitting the repeal to public vote.
Voters in the City of St. Mary’s passed a ballot measure in 1986 to
27
levy a three percent sales tax. St. Mary’s city council implemented
the voter-approved sales tax, but limited application of the three
28
percent tax to the first $1000 of each sales transaction. In 1994,
the council moved to repeal the exemption and held public hear29
ings after posting notice in various local establishments. The repeal ordinance passed over the objections of the defendants,
Alaska Commercial Company (“ACC”) and St. Mary’s Native
30
Corporation (“SMNC”), who later refused to pay the excess tax.
The supreme court, overturning summary judgment to ACC and
SMNC, held that the repeal did not require submission for public
vote because the ordinance neither increased “the rate of levy” of a
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

2 P.3d 1222 (Alaska 2000).
Id. at 1223 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.155(f) (LEXIS 2000)).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1225.
Id.
9 P.3d 1002 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 1004.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1004-05.
See id. at 1005.
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sales tax nor created a “new” sales tax under Alaska Statutes section 29.45.670.31 The court held that a genuine issue of fact existed
as to whether giving notice of the council meeting in the Tundra
Drums newspaper would have satisfied Alaska Statutes section
29.45.670’s mandatory requirement that local governments publish
notice in a newspaper of general circulation if such a newspaper
32
exists in a community.
In Department of Commerce and Economic Development v.
33
Schnell, the supreme court reversed the superior court’s ruling
that estopped the Division of Insurance (the “Division”) from suspending or conditioning Schnell’s insurance agent license, and or34
dered the Division to reconsider its sanctions decision on remand.
In 1992, Schnell was convicted of felony false declaration in con35
nection with his 1987 petition for personal bankruptcy. In an attempt to revoke Schnell’s insurance agent license, the Division
conducted a hearing in 1993 on the matter, but rejected the hearing
36
officer’s proposed sanctions. Schnell’s license was renewed until
1995, when a new Division director issued a final decision on the
37
matter and suspended Schnell’s license for six months. On appeal, the superior court held that the State was estopped from sanc38
tioning Schnell. The supreme court reversed the superior court,
because the Division never asserted, by its conduct or words, that
the matter was resolved; therefore, the Division was not estopped
39
from sanctioning Schnell. In addition, the doctrine of laches did
not bar the State’s action because laches does not bar claims caused
40
by adjudicatory delay. However, because Schnell did not have an
opportunity to present evidence of his post-1992 conduct, the court
remanded and instructed the Division to consider current evidence
41
in sanctioning Schnell.
In Department of Public Safety v. Shakespeare,42 the supreme
court held that the Department of Public Safety could not revoke
an arrestee’s driver’s license for her initial refusal to take a breath

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 1008 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 29.45.670 (LEXIS 2000)).
See id. at 1011-12.
8 P.3d 351 (Alaska 2000).
See id.
See id. at 354.
See id.
See id. at 354-55.
See id.
See id. at 358.
See id. at 359.
See id. at 360.
4 P.3d 322 (Alaska 2000).
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test when she subsequently changed her mind and the test was administered.43 Shakespeare was arrested for driving while intoxicated (“DWI”) and was taken to the local state trooper detach44
ment for a breath test. She refused to take the breath test and was
notified that the Department of Public Safety, under Alaska’s im45
plied consent statutes, would revoke her license administratively
46
as a consequence. Shortly after surrendering her license, Shake47
speare changed her mind. Although the police permitted Shakespeare to take a breath test and obtained potentially probative results, the Department of Public Safety revoked Shakespeare’s
license administratively based on her initial refusal to take a breath
48
test. The supreme court held that it would be “unfair and inconsistent” to revoke her driver’s license when she “cured” her prior
49
refusal by submitting to the test.
50
In Department of Revenue v. DynCorp, the supreme court
held that the Office of Tax Appeals erred when it relieved DynCorp from the penalty assessed by the Department of Revenue for
51
failing to file timely amended state tax returns. Under Alaska
Statutes section 43.20.030(d), DynCorp was required to notify the
Department of Revenue of any tax adjustments made pursuant to
an IRS audit and pay the additional taxes within sixty days after
52
the IRS issued its final decision. Citing a large workload and insufficient personnel, DynCorp did not file its notice within the
53
sixty-day deadline. As a result, the Department of Revenue levied a penalty against DynCorp, which DynCorp appealed to the
54
Office of Tax Appeals. The Office of Tax Appeals found that
DynCorp’s failure to pay the additional taxes within the statutory
55
period was due to a reasonable cause. Although the supreme
court held that the Office of Tax Appeals can exercise its independent judgment when reviewing appeals, it held that the Office
of Tax Appeals erred when it found that DynCorp’s failure to
comply with the law was due to a reasonable cause and not willful
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See id. at 326.
See id. at 323.
See ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.031(a) (LEXIS 2000).
See Shakespeare, 4 P.3d at 324.
See id.
See id
Id. at 325-26.
14 P.3d 981 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 989.
See id. at 982.
See id. at 983.
See id.
See id.
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neglect.56 To have reasonable cause for noncompliance, the taxpayer must show that it exercised ordinary business care and pru57
dence. The court held that DynCorp did not exercise ordinary
business care and prudence because its failure to file was caused by
circumstances under its control, such as the failure to use its re58
sources efficiently. Therefore, the court reversed the decision of
59
the Office of Tax Appeals and reinstated the penalty.
In Gwich’in Steering Committee v. Office of the Governor,60 the
supreme court held that documents from the Governor’s Office
relating to lobbying efforts regarding drilling in the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge (“ANWR”) were protected as predecisional and
61
deliberative. The Gwich’in Steering Committee is a nonprofit organization with interests in protecting ANWR from oil exploration
62
and drilling. The Gwich’in Steering Committee requested docu63
ments from the Governor’s Office relating to ANWR. The Governor’s Office provided some, but not all, of the desired materials
and claimed that the withheld materials were protected by the pre64
decisional deliberative process privilege. The court noted that
public officials may claim the privilege when disclosure would
hamper the “open exchange of opinions and recommendations be65
tween government officials.” A predecisional communication is
66
one that was made before the deliberative process is finished. A
67
document must also be deliberative to qualify as privileged. The
court noted that a deliberative document reflects “the ‘give-andtake’ of the decisionmaking process and contains opinions, recom68
mendations, or advice about agency policies.” Once a document
meets both of the above prongs, the burden switches to the party
desiring disclosure to show that the benefits of disclosure outweigh
69
the government’s interest in protecting the document. The supreme court held that the privilege protects “any government decisionmaking function, including the governor’s policymaking and
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See id. at 985, 989.
See id. at 985-86.
See id. at 987.
See id. at 989.
10 P.3d 572 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 585-86.
See id. at 576.
See id. at 576-77.
See id. at 577.
Id. at 578.
See id. at 579.
See id.
Id.
See id.
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lobbying of either state or federal government.”70 Finally, the supreme court vacated a portion of the superior court’s ruling which
71
ordered Gwich’in to pay attorney’s fees to the Governor’s Office.
72
In In re Johnstone, the supreme court affirmed the Alaska
Commission on Judicial Conduct’s recommendation that former
Superior Court Judge Karl Johnstone should be publicly repri73
manded for creating an appearance of impropriety. Johnstone
was responsible for appointing a coroner for Alaska’s Third Judi74
cial District. Initially, he asked the court administrator to begin
the recruitment process, which has several formal procedural re75
quirements. However, after the recruitment process had been
substantially completed, Chief Justice Daniel Moore recommended
76
a personal friend of his, Richard McVeigh, for the job. Even
though McVeigh did not submit a formal application and the interviewing committee did not rank him highly compared to other can77
didates, Johnstone appointed McVeigh on a temporary basis. After a complaint was filed, the Alaska Commission on Judicial
Conduct “found the evidence insufficient to establish actual impropriety but sufficient to support the conclusion that Judge
Johnstone had created an appearance of impropriety in hiring
78
McVeigh.” Applying Alaska Statutes section 22.30.080(2), the
court determined that the commission had jurisdiction over
Johnstone, even though Johnstone subsequently retired, because
he was an active judge both when the alleged impropriety occurred
79
and when the commission began the investigation. The court affirmed the commission’s finding that Johnstone created an appearance of impropriety and accepted the recommendation that a pub80
lic reprimand be issued.
In Jerrel v. Department of Natural Resources,81 the supreme
court held that the Department of Natural Resources (the “Department”) was not estopped from enforcing a regulation that it
82
had never previously enforced; however, the requirement that
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 583-84.
See id. at 585-86.
2 P.3d 1226 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 1228.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1229.
See id.
Id. at 1230.
See id. at 1231-32.
See id. at 1238.
999 P.2d 138 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 142.

YIR_FMT.DOC

2001]

04/24/01 12:03 PM

THE YEAR IN REVIEW

79

livestock markings be visible was not adopted in accordance with
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and thus was not a
83
valid regulation. Dan and Viola Jerrel had a lease with the State
84
The Jerrels’ neighbors comof Alaska to ranch their horses.
plained that loose horses were damaging property, yet the belief
that the damage was caused by the Jerrels’ horses could not be sub85
stantiated because the Jerrels’ horses were not marked. The Department informed the Jerrels of the requirement under Alaska
Administrative Code title 11, section 60.070 that livestock be
marked, and the Department also informed them that such mark86
ings must be visible from twenty feet away. The court found that
the Department could not be estopped from enforcing the Alaska
marking requirement even though it had not previously enforced
87
the requirement. However, the court did not allow the Department to enforce the twenty foot visibility requirement of such
88
markings. Although the Department claimed the requirement
89
was “an informal ‘policy rule’ rather than a regulation,” the court
disagreed and held the regulation invalid since it was not adopted
90
through the proper procedural standards set forth in the APA.
In Kachemak Bay Conservation Society v. Department of
91
Natural Resources, the supreme court affirmed the Department of
Natural Resources’ (the “Department”) decision to approve a gas
92
and oil lease program. In 1996, the State offered to lease over one
million acres of state-owned land for petroleum exploration and
93
development. The Department determined that the sale was in
the best interests of the State and that the sale was consistent with
94
the Alaska Coastal Management Plan. Kachemak Bay challenged
both of these determinations and further argued that the Department impermissibly “phased” its review (i.e., divided its proposal
into discrete parts, such as exploration, construction, and produc95
tion). Kachemak Bay unsuccessfully moved for an injunction

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See id. at 139.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 140.
See id. at 142.
See id. at 146.
Id. at 143.
See id. at 144.
6 P.3d 270 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 294.
See id. at 274.
See id.
See id.
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against the lease sale, which took place in December 1996.96 In
January 1998, the superior court upheld the Department’s best in97
terests finding and its conclusive consistency determination. The
supreme court held that the Department was expressly permitted
to “phase” its review of a proposed disposition of land by Alaska
98
Statutes section 38.05.035. The court further affirmed the Department’s best interests finding, concluding that the Department
99
had a reasonable basis for its decision. The supreme court also
held that the Department took the requisite “hard look” at the
situation and was reasonable in concluding that the proposed lease
100
sale was consistent with the habitats standard.
In Native Village of Eklutna v. Board of Adjustment for the
101
Municipality of Anchorage, the supreme court vacated the superior court’s affirmation of a permit for a granite mining operation
that would destroy a culturally significant hill and remanded for
102
The court
consideration of the cultural impact of the mining.
found that a five-page report, based primarily upon a walking survey, did not provide substantial evidence to determine that the
103
Further, other eviquarry would not affect cultural resources.
dence in the record, including testimony that the village of Eklutna
is named for two granite hills, one of which was slated for mining,
established that some cultural resources would certainly be ad104
versely affected by the quarry. Therefore, the court held that on
remand, the extent of such adverse effects should be determined
and considered in light of the goals of preserving historic and ar105
chaeological resources.
In Ninilchik Traditional Council v. United States,106 the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in
part the Federal Subsistence Board’s (the “Board”) decision to impose a spike-fork/fifty-inch antler restriction on subsistence uses of
moose in Game Management Unit (“GMU”) 15 located on the
107
Kenai Peninsula. The federal government is charged with regu-

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See id. at 275.
See id.
See id. at 279 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.035 (LEXIS 2000)).
See id. at 286.
See id. at 288.
995 P.2d 641 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 645.
See id. at 644-45.
See id.
See id. at 645.
227 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2000).
See id. at 1189.
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lating subsistence hunting use priority, and the Federal Subsistence
Board determined subsistence hunting should be permitted in
108
GMU 15, with a spike-fork/fifty-inch antler restriction on moose.
Ninilchik argued this restriction violated the provision in 16 U.S.C.
109
The court upheld
§ 3114 giving priority to subsistence hunters.
the Board’s decision, which accorded subsistence hunters priority,
110
Furtherbut not absolute priority, over non-subsistence uses.
more, the court found the priority afforded by the Board to subsistence hunters was indeed meaningful as it “was necessary to ‘protect the continued viability’ of the moose population as required
111
However, the court then determined the
under section 3114.”
Board erred in concluding that a two-day hunting period reserved
for subsistence users gave adequate “priority” to subsistence users
within the meaning of the statute, as this period was shortened to
112
allow for a non-subsistence bow-and-arrow hunt.
113
In O’Callaghan v. Sweat, the supreme court validated a policy set by the Commissioner of Fish and Game permitting salmon
114
roe stripping for certain overstocked species. Mike O’Callaghan,
an officer of the non-profit organization EARTH, contested that
roe stripping, or removing eggs from salmon and discarding the
flesh, violated Alaska Statutes section 16.05.831, which prohibits
115
The court held that the legislature delethe waste of salmon.
gated sufficient authority to the Commissioner to promulgate
116
Furthermore, since there was a surplus of salmon
regulations.
that were subject to roe stripping, the regulation was consistent
117
with the salmon waste law.
In Office of Public Advocacy v. Superior Court,118 the supreme
court held that Alaska Criminal Rule 39(e)(2)(B) and Alaska Administrative Rule 12 allowed the trial court discretion to craft a
remedy to reimburse the state for the services of the Office of Pub119
lic Advocacy (“OPA”) counsel. A father was appointed counsel
from the OPA, and was later found to exceed the maximum in-

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See id. at 1189-90.
See id. at 1193.
See id.
Id. at 1194.
See id. at 1195-96.
996 P.2d 88 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 91.
See id. at 93.
See id. at 96.
See id. at 98.
3 P.3d 932 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 934.
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come level allowed for the service to be paid for by the State.120
The trial court ordered the father to reimburse the State for the
costs of the representation at a rate of $100 per hour plus the law121
The supreme court held that
yer’s airfare and hotel expenses.
Criminal Rule 39(e) applied: the court could either terminate the
122
legal services or continue the services and recapture the costs.
123
In Said v. Eddy, the district court dismissed Said’s complaint
for declaratory and injunctive relief from removal proceedings by
124
Said was
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”).
125
born in Yemen and brought to the United States by her father.
Said was convicted of an aggravated felony and, as an alleged alien,
126
the INS began removal proceedings. During those proceedings,
Said and the INS entered into a stipulation providing that the INS
127
would stay her removal if she would not appeal the proceeding.
The INS then moved to dismiss Said’s previous complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that the issue was
128
Said argued that she could
moot as a result of the stipulation.
129
maintain her complaint under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a). However, because no department, agency, or official denied her claim that she
was a United States citizen, the court found that she was not enti130
tled to declaratory relief under § 1503. In addition, § 1503 does
not apply to persons within the United States where the issue of
131
citizenship arose in connection with any removal proceeding.
132
In Schikora v. Department of Revenue, the supreme court
found that, under former Alaska Statutes section 43.23.095(8) and
Alaska Administrative Code title 15, section 23.163, when a State
resident is absent from the State for more than 180 days in any
year, that person does not meet the residency requirement for receiving permanent fund dividends even when, at the time of the
133
The supreme
application, the resident is present in the State.
court upheld the superior court’s decision not to allow Schikora to
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See id. at 933.
See id.
See id. at 934-35.
87 F. Supp. 2d. 937 (D. Alaska 2000).
See id. at 944.
See id. at 937.
See id. at 938.
See id. at 939.
See id.
See id. at 940 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1503(1994)).
See id.
See id. at 941.
7 P.3d 938 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 939.
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receive permanent fund dividends for years in which his absence
from Alaska exceeded 180 days.134 Schikora argued that, because
he was a State resident present in Alaska at the time when he had
applied for his dividends, he should have received the dividends
135
under former Alaska Statutes section 43.23.095(8). Alaska Statutes section 43.23.095(8) made a person eligible to receive dividends if “on the date of application the individual is a state resi136
dent.” Schikora claimed that he had been a State resident since
1945 and thus should receive the dividends because he was in
137
Alaska at the time of application. The supreme court held, however, that “[s]ince Schikora was not physically present for the entire qualifying period for any of his permanent fund dividend appli138
cations in question . . . he must account for his absences.”
Because Schikora’s absences for business, leisure, and unsubstantiated medical care did not satisfy the statute, he could not receive
139
the dividend. Further, the supreme court found that the permanent fund dividend regulations did not deny Schikora due process
of law or equal protection and did not interfere with interstate
140
commerce.
In Skvorc II v. Personnel Board,141 the supreme court remanded to the superior court the issue of whether lack of notice
was prejudicial to Skvorc, but affirmed the superior court’s finding
that the Alaska Personnel Board could recommend Skvorc’s ter142
Skvorc worked for the Alaska Demination of employment.
partment of Fish and Game (the “Department”) when he was accused of twenty-three violations of the Alaska Executive Branch
143
Ethics Act. Skvorc started his own company in order to develop
a fisheries management tool and then used government funds to
solicit business for this company without notifying the Depart144
ment. Skvorc argued that the initial complaint’s failure to state
three of the twenty-three allegations violated his procedural due
process rights for two reasons: inadequate notice and inability to

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See id.
See id. at 940 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.095(8) (LEXIS 2000)).
Id. at 942.
See id.
Id. at 943.
See id. at 942.
See id. at 944-46.
996 P.2d 1192 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 1195.
See id.
See id. at 1195-96.
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respond.145 The supreme court stated that “it is not necessary to
serve an amended complaint charging all counts later charged in
146
However, the court found that one of the
the accusation.”
twenty-three allegations did not give Skvorc adequate notice because the amended complaint omitted the specific incidences of
147
The court then
misuse with which he was eventually charged.
remanded for determination whether the omission had been preju148
dicial to Skvorc.
In Stosh’s Inspection and Maintenance v. Fairbanks North Star
149
Borough, the supreme court upheld the decision of the Fairbanks
North Star Borough Pollution Control Commission (“PCC”) to
150
suspend Stoshu Solski’s license to perform emissions inspections.
Because Solski had five prior violations detected through covert
audits, the court held that PCC followed procedure in selecting
Solski for an audit under the “as needed” language of the program
151
procedures. In addition, the lack of an auditor training program
152
The goals of a training prodid not make the audit defective.
gram, primarily that a tester be familiar with and adhere to PCC
153
procedures and state regulations, had been met.
In United Parcel Service Co. v. Department of Revenue,154 the
supreme court held that all jet fuel purchased at the pump in
Alaska and used for domestic flights originating from Alaska was
155
taxable under Alaska Statutes section 43.40.010(b). United Parcel Service Co. (“UPS”) made bulk purchases of jet fuel in An156
Since UPS
chorage between December 1991 and March 1993.
used some of the jet fuel for direct flights to foreign countries, it
was exempt from paying tax directly upon purchase under Alaska
157
Statutes section 43.40.020(b). Accordingly, UPS contended it was
subject to tax as “a user” under section 43.40.010(b), not as “a purchaser,” and that, “as a user, it should pay only for the actual fuel
158
‘consumed’ by its domestic flights within Alaska.” Rejecting this
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See id. at 1195, 1197.
Id. at 1205.
See id.
See id. at 1195, 1207.
12 P.3d 1180 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 1181.
See id. at 1184-85.
See id. at 1185.
See id. at 1185-86.
1 P.3d 83 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 89-90 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 43.40.010(b) (LEXIS 2000)).
See id. at 84.
See id. at 87.
Id.
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theory, the supreme court found that the legislative history inferred
an intent to “subject purchasers and users to equivalent motor fuel
159
taxes.” Furthermore, the supreme court found that “since consumption is commonly . . . measured at the pump,” there is no reason to assume “that the legislature intended to adopt a less com160
mon and less sensible measure—moment of actual combustion.”
161
In United States v. Ertsgaard, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that the Individual Fishing Quota (“IFQ”)
regulations for halibut do not constitute a fishery management plan
162
In 1998, Ertsgaard was inunder the Magnuson-Stevens Act.
dicted for two violations of the Lacey Act, including the submission
of a false IFQ landing report and the harvesting, transmission, and
163
sale of 11,000 pounds of halibut in excess of his quota. Ertsgaard
claimed his alleged violations fell within one of the exceptions to
the Lacey Act, and that the activity was regulated by a fishery
164
management plan under the Magnuson-Stevens Act. The court
held that, although the regulations were created by the Northern
Pacific Fishery Management Council, an organization that was itself created by the Magnuson-Stevens Act, the regulations were
promulgated under the authority of the Halibut Act and subject to
165
the Lacey Act’s provisions.
III. BUSINESS LAW
166
In American Computer Institute, Inc. v. State, the supreme
court affirmed the superior court’s order that a school which had
closed during mid-term must refund tuition to students who could
not complete the course of study, but reversed the superior court’s
reduction in prejudgment interest and remanded the case for entry
of an order requiring the school to pay the statutorily set interest
167
American Computer Institute (“ACI”), a postsecondary
rate.
school providing vocational programs, closed its campuses in Fair168
banks and Anchorage without prior notice to students. ACI offered alternative programs which would enable the students to

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 88.
Id.
222 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 2000).
See id. at 618.
See id. at 615.
See id. at 616.
See id. at 617.
995 P.2d 647 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 656-57.
See id. at 649.
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complete the term.169 Nevertheless, some students at each campus
170
were not able to complete their instruction. On August 19, 1997,
the Alaska Commission on Postsecondary Education, acting on
behalf of these students, filed a request for an injunction requiring
ACI to provide the programs for which the students had paid tui171
tion, or to reimburse the students. The superior court held that
ACI had a contractual obligation to its students and that ACI’s al172
ternative measures did not limit its liability to its students. The
superior court ordered ACI to refund the tuition of the students,
but reduced the rate of prejudgment interest to the respective in173
The supreme court affirmed
terest rates paid by each student.
the order requiring ACI to reimburse the students, but held that
the superior court erred in reducing the prejudgment interest. The
supreme court reversed and remanded for entry of an order requiring ACI to pay the interest rate specified in Alaska Statutes
174
section 09.30.070(a), which sets the interest rate on judgments.
175
In In re Bonham, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that a bankruptcy court may order substantive consolidation
176
of non-debtor corporations nunc pro tunc. Bonham operated a
Ponzi scheme through two corporations, of which she was sole
177
Involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy
shareholder and director.
178
The
proceedings were ultimately instituted against Bonham.
Chapter 7 trustee filed a motion for substantive consolidation nunc
pro tunc of the two corporations with Bonham’s estate after investors in the Ponzi scheme challenged the trustee’s standing to avoid
179
transfers by the corporations. The bankruptcy court granted the
180
motion and the investors appealed. The court first held that the
order of the bankruptcy court was final and appealable because
substantive consolidation affects substantive rights of involved par181
The court then adopted the substantive consolidation test
ties.
utilized by the Second Circuit: “(1) whether creditors dealt with the
entities as a single economic unit and did not rely on their separate
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See id. at 650.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 651.
See id.
See id.
229 F.3d 750 (9th Cir. 2000).
See id. at 771.
See id. at 759.
See id. at 761-62.
See id. at 766.
See id.
See id. at 761-62.
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identity in extending credit; or (2) whether the affairs of the debtor
are so entangled that consolidation will benefit all creditors.”182
The presence of either factor alone is sufficient, and both factors
183
were present here. Once this test is met, the court leaves the discretion whether consolidation nunc pro tunc is appropriate to the
184
Such power “should be sparingly used and
bankruptcy court.
185
must be tailored to meet the needs of each particular case.”
186
In Standifer v. State, the supreme court held that a district
court should have determined whether the petitioner’s student loan
187
Standifer
should have been discharged due to undue hardship.
188
obtained a student loan from the State of Alaska. Standifer later
filed for bankruptcy and was granted a discharge of his listed
189
debts. The state advised Standifer that his student loan was not
190
dischargeable and brought suit. A default judgment was entered
191
The district court denied Standifer’s Civil Rule
against him.
60(b) motion to vacate the default judgment, and the superior
192
court affirmed the district court’s ruling. The supreme court held
that under 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1), a debtor’s defense of bankruptcy
193
discharge cannot be waived for any reason. The bankruptcy discharge relieved the petitioner from defending himself as a debtor
194
in a subsequent action. The court reversed the district and superior courts’ judgments and remanded the case to the district court
to determine the dischargeability of Standifer’s student loan under
195
the federal bankruptcy act’s undue hardship provisions.

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. at 766.
See id.
See id. at 771.
Id.
3 P.3d 925 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 926.
See id.
See id. at 927
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 929.
See id.
See id.
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IV. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Costs and Attorney’s Fees
196
In Sanders v. Barth, the supreme court affirmed the superior
court’s denial of Civil Rule 82 attorney’s fees despite finding error
197
in the superior court’s application of the divorce rule exception.
Sanders claimed attorney’s fees because she had prevailed in a
child support proceeding that occurred ten years after the end of
198
the relationship between herself and defendant Barth. The superior court held that in divorce-type proceedings, attorney’s fees are
awarded based on the economic positions of the parties, but Sand199
ers had not sought such fees. On appeal, the supreme court recognized that this child support proceeding, taking place years after
the end of the relationship, did not resemble a divorce proceeding
200
However,
and thus could not fall under the divorce exception.
because the settlement agreement between the parties did not contemplate the payment of attorney’s fees and no evidence proved
that Barth knew that attorney’s fees were an issue, the superior
court’s application of the divorce rule exception was harmless er201
ror.
B. Damages
202
In Alaska General Alarm, Inc. v. Grinnell, the supreme court
held that the statute of limitations for tort actions did not apply to
203
claims for equitable apportionment. In 1993, the plaintiffs sued
Grinnell Corporation after suffering injuries from a discharge of
halon from a fire protection system while technicians from Grinnell
Corporation and Alaska General Alarm were examining the sys204
In 1996, Grinnell answered the plaintiffs’ complaint and
tem.
205
filed a third-party complaint against Alaska General Alarm.
Grinnell claimed that Alaska General Alarm was responsible in
206
Alaska General Alarm
whole or in part for plaintiffs’ injuries.
answered and filed a motion for partial summary judgment, argu196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

12 P.3d 766 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 767.
See id.
See id. at 767-68.
See id. at 768.
See id. at 769.
1 P.3d 98 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 99.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 99-100.
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ing that the statute of limitations barred the third-party complaint
because it was filed more than two years after the initial incident.207
The superior court denied the motion.208 The supreme court held
that Alaska Statutes section 09.17.080’s express language and legislative history did not require that defendants file third-party
claims for apportionment within the statute of limitations govern209
ing the plaintiffs’ underlying claim. Otherwise, the court would
undermine the statute’s purpose of apportioning liability equitably
210
The court also found that third parties
among at-fault parties.
211
must be joined in order to allocate fault and liability.
212
In Chilton-Wren v. Olds, the supreme court held that a forcible entry and detainer (“FED”) action deals exclusively with possession and that, in the absence of explicit waiver, raising counterclaims during a FED action does not preclude a party from
213
preserving litigation of claims for damages in a jury trial. After a
FED action was decided in favor of Janice Chilton-Wren, she
sought a jury trial on her five counterclaims and an additional civil
214
rights claim. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Wallace Olds, Chilton-Wren’s landlord, on the basis of col215
The court also held that Chilton-Wren had
lateral estoppel.
216
The supreme court reversed,
waived her right to a jury trial.
holding that under Civil Rule 38(a), the importance of a jury trial
217
The court also found that
requires an explicit waiver of rights.
218
The
collateral estoppel did not apply to such counterclaims.
court reasoned that “[a] tenant should not be forced to choose between being evicted from her home but preserving her right to seek
monetary damages or retaining possession of her home but for219
feiting recovery of her damages claims.”
220
In Dobos v. Swartout, an appeal from a lower court decision
in which a taxi driver was found liable for hitting a pedestrian, the
supreme court affirmed the trial court’s decision to admit the
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

See id. at 100.
See id.
See id. at 102 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080 (LEXIS 2000)).
See id. at 104.
See id.
1 P.3d 693 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 698.
See id. at 696.
See id. at 694.
See id.
See id. at 696.
See id. at 698.
Id.
9 P.3d 1020 (Alaska 2000).
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statement of the taxi passenger under the present sense impression
exception to the hearsay rule, and affirmed the lower court’s denial
221
of Dobos’ motion for a directed verdict. The court held that any
error that the trial court may have made in admitting the testimony
of the passenger under the hearsay exception was harmless because
the statement played a very small role in the trial, and other evidence was strong enough for the jury to have reached the same
222
The court held that the motion for a diconclusion without it.
rected verdict was properly denied because there was a triable is223
sue of fact as to Dobos’ negligence. Because Dobos reasonably
could believe that he was not negligent, the supreme court affirmed
the lower court decision not to award attorney’s fees under Alaska
Civil Rule 37(c)(2) for Dobos’ failure to admit negligence and cau224
However, the court held that fees should have been
sation.
granted to the plaintiff for Dobos’ failure to agree to the admissi225
bility of certain medical records.
226
In Griffith v. Taylor, the supreme court affirmed a jury’s
finding that legal malpractice was not the legal cause of Ned
227
Griffith’s damages. The court held that the lower court did not
err in precluding certain expert testimony that was offered six years
after the suit was filed, and Griffith did not attempt to modify the
228
pretrial order. In addition, a jury instruction about superseding
causation was appropriate because reasonable minds could differ
over whether damages were caused by the firm’s negligence or sub229
sequent forgery by Griffith’s father. Finally, the court held that
Griffith waived his right to challenge the jury verdict on jury polling grounds because his attorney told the court he was satisfied
230
with the polling of the jury.
In Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.,231
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s refusal to set aside punitive damages verdicts in the Exxon
Valdez oil spill litigation because of alleged irregularities during

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

See id. at 1020-22.
See id. at 1025.
See id. at 1025, 1028.
See id. at 1020, 1026.
See id. at 1020, 1027.
12 P.3d 1163 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 1169.
See id.
See id. at 1167-68.
See id. at 1168-69.
206 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2000).
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jury deliberations.232 Defendant Exxon had filed a motion for a
new trial on the basis of several incidents: a remark made by the
bailiff to another juror about putting emotionally distraught Juror
A “out of her misery,” an alleged threat to Juror A to put her in
jail if she refused to deliberate, and alleged threats to Juror A’s
233
daughters. The appeals court ruled that it was not abuse of discretion for the district court to find no actual prejudice from the
bailiff’s remark, because it was interpreted as a tasteless joke and
234
not heard by Juror A. It was also not clearly erroneous for the
235
district court to doubt Juror A’s credibility regarding the threats.
Juror A had not reported the threats until years after the trial, explaining that she had forgotten them, and testified for the first time
236
to numerous threats to her own life made during deliberations.
This implausible testimony and her extremely distraught condition
during and after the trial made it likely, the district court found,
237
that her memory of the events was distorted.
C. Miscellaneous
238
In Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc., v. Kritz, the supreme court affirmed the denial of permissive intervention to U.S.
English, Inc., and reversed the denial of intervention for Alaskans
for a Common Language, Inc., in an action to determine the constitutionality of a successful ballot initiative requiring the Alaska government to use English as its official language. Alaskans for a
239
Common Language sponsored the initiative. Noting that initiative committee members have a constitutionally based, heightened
interest in a lawsuit to determine whether the successful initiative
will be enforced and a legal obligation to represent initiative sponsors in all related matters, the court found these interests met the
240
criteria for intervention as of right under Alaska Civil Rule 24(a).
To determine whether Alaskans for a Common Language had
standing to represent the initiative sponsors, the court adopted the
U.S. Supreme Court’s test: an association has standing to bring suit
on behalf of its members when (1) its members would otherwise
have standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests it seeks to
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

See id. at 903.
Id. at 904-05.
See id. at 906-07.
See id. at 913.
See id. at 908-12.
See id. at 912-13.
3 P.3d 906 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 914.
See id. at 912-14.
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protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (3) neither
the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participa241
The supreme court
tion of individual members in the lawsuit.
held that Alaskans for a Common Language, which was formed for
the sole purpose of sponsoring the ballot initiative, met this test
and thus had associational standing to represent the initiative spon242
sors. The supreme court further held that U.S. English lacked a
direct interest and failed to raise any new issues in the current leg243
islation that would justify an intervention as a matter of right.
244
In Barrett v. Era Aviation, Inc., the supreme court held that
two jury instructions with potentially conflicting definitions of negligence constituted reversible error and remanded the case for a
245
Mickey Barrett was a passenger on an Era Aviation
new trial.
246
flight. He later filed suit against Era claiming that damage to his
inner ear resulted from negligent maintenance of the plane’s pres247
surization system. Barrett hired an expert, who was not licensed
248
as a mechanic, to testify about the plane’s pressurization system.
The court ruled that Barrett’s expert was competent because the
standard for experts is “whether the jury can receive appreciable
249
help from this particular person on this particular subject.” The
court, however, did not remand on those grounds, but instead
found that the failure to correct the jury instructions was a legal er250
ror. The judge had included two instructions on negligence: one
relating to general negligence and one relating to the negligence
251
standard of a common carrier. The supreme court reasoned that
once Era was found within the ambit of a common carrier, the
higher standard of care—the utmost duty of care—was applica252
ble.
In Bauman v. Commissioner,253 the district court granted the
Internal Revenue Service’s (“IRS”) motion to dismiss the com241. See id. at 915 (citing Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432
U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).
242. See id. at 915-16.
243. See id. at 916.
244. 996 P.2d 101 (Alaska 2000).
245. See id. at 102.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. See id. at 103.
249. Id.
250. See id. at 105.
251. See id. at 104.
252. See id.
253. No. A99-0491-CV(HRH), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2424, at *1 (D. Alaska
Jan. 31, 2000).
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plaint of taxpayers who were audited by the IRS and contested the
resulting adjustments to their tax returns.254 The tax court sent the
decisions on the Baumans’ cases to their attorney, but the attorney
255
never notified the Baumans. The Baumans filed a cause of action
in district court arguing that the tax court decisions were wrong and
that they were entitled to a new hearing because they did not re256
In response to the defenceive timely notice of the decisions.
dant’s motion to dismiss, the Baumans argued that res judicata
does not apply to the tax court decisions because they were denied
257
However, because plaintiffs’ counsel received the
due process.
tax court’s decisions and the plaintiffs could have appealed, the
court held that there was no lack of due process and applied the
258
The court dismissed the Baumans’
doctrine of res judicata.
259
claim.
260
In Copper River School District v. Traw, the supreme court
reversed the trial court’s summary judgment and remanded for fur261
ther proceeding. The Copper Valley School Board passed a motion to offer retirement incentives to teachers with seniority, but
administrators later discovered that they had miscalculated the fi262
Before the Board could meet
nancial effect of the incentives.
again and rescind the motion, six teachers “accepted” the retire263
ment plan. When the school district refused to pay the teachers
the amount specified in the motion, the teachers sued for breach of
contract, and the trial court granted the teachers’ motion for sum264
On appeal, the school district argued that the
mary judgment.
motion was not an “offer” and, even if it was an offer, the district
administrators’ communications effectively terminated the teach265
ers’ power of acceptance. The supreme court found that it was
unclear whether the school board’s motion constituted an “offer,”
and that this is therefore a matter to be determined by a finder of
266
The court further held that the district administrators’
fact.
communications (telling the teachers that they couldn’t accept the
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

See id. at *1-2, 10.
See id. at *2-3.
See id. at *4-5.
See id. at *6.
See id. at *8.
See id. at *10.
9 P.3d 280 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 288.
See id. at 281.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 282.
See id. at 286.
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motion and not to accept it) did not necessarily revoke any offer,
but that this, too, was a matter for the fact finder.267 Since issues of
material fact remained, the supreme court held that summary
judgment was improperly granted, and reversed and remanded for
268
further proceedings.
In Harpole v. United States,269 the district court dismissed Harpole’s petition seeking to vacate prior tax court orders and sanctions, and to permanently enjoin that judge from exercising any
270
The judge had declared
further jurisdiction over this tax case.
Harpole’s brief to be frivolous and levied $20,000 in sanctions after
271
Harpole continued to advance those arguments. Harpole’s petition to the district court sought equitable relief and named as defendants the Tax Court, the judge in his tax case, and the United
272
States. The district court held that Harpole offered no authority
that the Tax Court could be sued and dismissed the petition as to
273
that defendant. The United States was also dismissed as a defendant because no executive agency action was involved to trigger a
274
waiver of sovereign immunity. The tax court judge was dismissed
as a defendant because as a federal judicial officer, she is immune
275
from suits involving declaratory and injunctive relief. Finally, the
court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Harpole’s petition because the petition was simply an appeal of his Tax
Court case and all issues would be addressed on direct appeal from
276
that court.
In Hikita v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd.,277 the supreme court
held that the superior court improperly dismissed a suit arising out
278
The superior court dismissed on
of tort and contract claims.
three grounds: (1) as a sanction for violations of discovery; (2) be279
cause of issue preclusion; and (3) on the merits of the case. The
litigation entailed a joint venture fish processing facility that had
280
The
been abandoned in 1974, leading to at least five lawsuits.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

See id. at 287.
See id. at 288.
206 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2000).
See id. at 907.
See id. at 904.
See id.
See id. at 905-06.
See id. at 906.
See id. at 907.
See id. at 906-07.
12 P.3d 1169 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 1171-72.
See id.
See id. at 1172.
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court held that before litigation-ending sanctions are imposed for
discovery violations, the superior court must examine alternative
281
lesser sanctions. The case should not have been dismissed for issue preclusion because the interests of the plaintiffs were not
282
Finally,
aligned with those of the party in the earlier litigation.
summary judgment should not have been granted because the defendants failed to meet their burden of establishing that plaintiff’s
283
case was without merit. The order of dismissal was therefore va284
cated.
In MacDonald v. State,285 the court of appeals held that an individual could be prosecuted for violating a domestic violence protective order under Alaska Statutes section 11.56.740(a) without
being formally served with a written copy of the order, as long as
286
the defendant had actual knowledge of the protective order.
MacDonald was charged with five counts of violating a domestic
287
violence protective order. He filed a motion in district court to
dismiss the charges against him, claiming that the court lacked jurisdiction over him because he had not been formally served with a
288
written copy of the order in accordance with Alaska Civil Rule 4.
After finding that MacDonald had actual knowledge of the domestic violence protective order at the time the violations occurred, the
289
Macdistrict court denied MacDonald’s motion to dismiss.
Donald subsequently pled no contest and was found guilty of one
count of violating a domestic violence protective order in each of
290
The court of appeals upheld MacDonald’s
two separate cases.
conviction, holding that actual notice is all that is required in a
criminal contempt proceeding for a defendant to be bound by a
291
court order.
In Martinez v. Ha,292 the supreme court affirmed a grant of
summary judgment to the defendant in a medical malpractice
293
case. Martinez failed to disclose a list of experts and did not respond to an order to show cause or to Dr. Ha’s motion for sum281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

See id. at 1176.
See id. at 1177-78.
See id. at 1179.
See id. at 1180.
997 P.2d 1187 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
See id. at 1189.
See id. at 1188.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1189.
12 P.3d 1159 (Alaska 2000).
See id.
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mary judgment.294 Without expert testimony or other evidence opposing Dr. Ha’s expert report concluding there was no evidence of
malpractice, the trial court determined that a prima facie case
295
Because no admissible evidence was
could not be established.
presented by Martinez until after summary judgment had been
296
granted in favor of Ha, summary judgment for Ha was affirmed.
297
In Odom v. Fairbanks Memorial Hospital, the supreme court
held that the superior court erred in dismissing eight out of eleven
claims for relief against Fairbanks Memorial Hospital (“FMH”)
298
arising out of the termination of Odom’s staff privileges. FMH
299
employed Odom as an anesthesiologist from 1988 through 1994.
Odom told FMH that he wanted to open an outpatient surgery cen300
ter in 1992. In 1994, after a Special Investigative Committee’s investigation of quality assurance issues involving Odom, the FMH
Executive Committee recommended that he lose temporarily his
staff privileges at FMH unless he agreed to practice medicine un301
der supervision there or completed further training. While Odom
was in a formal retraining program, FMH terminated his staff
302
membership and clinical privileges. Odom argued that his intention to compete with FMH led to the quality assurance investigation, and the information in FMH’s report to a national reporting
303
system was false.
Odom alleged eleven claims of relief in his suit against FMH
and other health care providers, all of which were dismissed for
304
failure to state a claim. The supreme court reversed the dismissal
of eight claims, holding that a complaint should be construed liberally and deemed sufficient if evidence may emerge that supports a
305
grant of relief to the plaintiff. The court held that Odom’s complaint alleged facts which, if proven, would be enough to state a
claim for unreasonable restraint of trade, group boycott, attempted
monopolization, defamation, breach of oral contract, unfair trade

294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

See id. at 1161.
See id.
See id. at 1162-63.
999 P.2d 123 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 127.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 127-28.
See id.
See id.

YIR_FMT.DOC

2001]

04/24/01 12:03 PM

THE YEAR IN REVIEW

97

practices, interference with a prospective economic advantage, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.306
In Silvers v. Silvers,307 the supreme court held it was error not
to allow a son to testify by telephone in a suit brought by his
308
mother to recover loan advances and personal property. Defendant Irene Silvers advanced money to her son, plaintiff Michael
309
Irene and her domestic companion
Silvers, over several years.
also stored several items of personal property at Michael’s resi310
dence. After Michael sold his house, Irene discovered that nu311
merous items belonging to her had disappeared. She filed suit for
conversion of her missing personal property and repayment of the
312
advanced funds. The superior court awarded damages in a trial
313
in which Michael did not appear.
The supreme court held that the superior court committed reversible error by rejecting Michael’s request to appear at trial tele314
The court
phonically since Michael had relocated out-of-state.
held that Michael’s promise to repay the money that Irene advanced him without a specific time of repayment term did not fail
315
for indefiniteness. The pledge to repay the money when Michael
became financially able was a conditional promise, which became
316
The
legally enforceable when Michael satisfied the condition.
court remanded the issue to determine when Michael in fact became financially able to repay the loans and to apply the statute of
317
limitations from that date. The court held that, on remand, Irene
could join her domestic companion’s estate as a party to the litigation or alternatively could seek recovery for only her share of the
318
allegedly converted property.
319
In Stinson v. Russell, the supreme court held that the lower
court abused its discretion by denying appellant Stinson’s Alaska
Civil Rule 60(b) motion without making a determination with respect to the issue of incompetence on which the motion was
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

See id. at 133.
999 P.2d 786 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 790, 794.
See id. at 788.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 790.
See id. at 790-791.
See id. at 791.
See id.
See id. at 792.
996 P.2d 1238 (Alaska 2000).
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based.320 The appellant real estate agent was found to have
breached his fiduciary duty to buyers of a home and was held liable
for damages following a trial that he did not attend due to a serious
321
He subsequently moved for relief from the
medical condition.
judgment under Rule 60(b) on the grounds that he had been legally
incompetent at the time of trial, and thus had been incapable of
understanding the consequences of failing to attend the trial or re322
Although Stinson made a prima facie
questing a continuance.
showing of incompetence, the lower court denied the motion with323
out conducting an evidentiary hearing. The supreme court held
that this was an abuse of discretion because the motion papers revealed a genuine dispute as to Stinson’s competence when he chose
not to attend the trial, present a defense, or move for a continuance, and “[these] circumstances demonstrated the probable prejudice resulting from any incompetency, and therefore demonstrated
324
the materiality of the dispute.”
In White v. Department of Natural Resources,325 the supreme
court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of the Department of Natural Resources (the “Depart326
ment”). White owned two state oil and gas leases that occupied
327
White applied to transfer the
state mental health trust land.
leases, but before the Department acted on the applications, a
court order was issued that barred the state from transferring any
328
interest in mental health trust land without the court’s approval.
As a result, White’s applications were denied, and when he took no
329
further action, his leases expired. He appealed their expiration to
the Department and eventually to the supreme court on a force
majeure theory, but the court upheld the Department’s determina330
tion that White was responsible for allowing the leases to expire.
In this subsequent action for breach of contract and unlawful taking of property, the supreme court held that res judicata barred his
claims because he challenged the same departmental actions that
he litigated in his prior case in which a final judgment against him

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

See id. at 1239.
See id. at 1239-40.
See id. at 1239-41.
See id. at 1240.
Id. at 1242.
14 P.3d 956 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 963.
See id. at 958.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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was issued.331 In addition, the court held that because White did
not show prejudicial error, the superior court did not err when it
converted the Department’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
to a motion for summary judgment and, as a result, did not give
332
White time to submit additional evidence.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Due Process
333
In Halliburton Energy Services v. Department of Labor, the
supreme court held that process safety management standards
were sufficiently clear as applied to the manufacture of perforation
334
guns to avoid a constitutional challenge. After a fatal explosion
at the Halliburton plant, the Department of Labor assessed a fine
for violating process safety management standards in the manufac335
ture of explosives. The supreme court rejected Halliburton’s argument that manufacturing perforation guns falls under a regulatory exemption for “oil well servicing activities,” because
manufacturing the guns and the act of perforating wells are two dif336
The court also referent activities, and pose different hazards.
jected Halliburton’s constitutional claim, holding that the safety
standards were sufficiently clear to provide notice to Halliburton
for three reasons: (1) Halliburton presented no clear evidence of
inconsistent agency positions, (2) Halliburton did not demonstrate
reliance on a particular interpretation, and (3) a company in Halliburton’s position bears a “substantial burden of inquiry” concern337
ing applicable safety standards.
338
In Raphael v. State, the supreme court held that the trial
court denied the defendant his due process right and his right to be
present at trial by incarcerating a witness at an ex parte hearing
prior to her testimony.339 Wilfred Raphael was indicted for the kidnapping and assault of I.W., his live-in companion.340 I.W. was

331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

See id. at 960.
See id. at 962-63.
2 P.3d 41 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 51.
See id. at 42.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 55.
994 P.2d 1004 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 1016.
See id. at 1006.
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341

scheduled to testify at Raphael’s trial.
During a recess, the
prosecutor spoke with the trial judge about I.W.’s testimony without Raphael or his attorney present.342 The prosecutor expressed
concern over I.W.’s drinking and the possibility of her recanting
her testimony.343 The trial court decided to place I.W. in jail and
her children in protective custody until she gave her testimony.344
I.W. testified and Raphael was convicted.345
On appeal, the supreme court held that the State coerced I.W.
to testify favorably on its behalf by implying continued incarcera346
tion and loss of custody of her children, and therefore, her testi347
The court also
mony violated Raphael’s right to due process.
held that the trial court’s ex parte hearing violated Raphael’s right
to be present at every stage of his trial under Alaska Criminal Rule
348
38(a). Even though Raphael’s counsel failed to object to the ex
parte hearing or I.W.’s testimony at trial, the court held that the
trial court committed plain error, and as a result, the court could
349
The court reversed Raphael’s
review these errors on appeal,.
350
conviction and remanded for a new trial.
B. Miscellaneous
In Bethel Native Corp. v. Department of the Interior,351 the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a third-party claim
for equitable apportionment brought by the United States against
352
Alaska was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Bethel Native Corporation brought suit against the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act after diesel fuel leaked onto its property
from a storage site operated by the United States Bureau of Indian
353
The United States then brought a third-party claim
Affairs.
against the State, the city to whom the fuel had been sold, and the
city’s allegedly negligent contractors, seeking equitable apportion-

341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1007.
See id. at 1008-10.
See id. at 1010.
See id. at 1011-13.
See id. at 1015.
See id. at 1016.
208 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2000).
See id. at 1177.
See id. at 1172-73.
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ment of tort liability.354 The State’s motion to dismiss the claim on
the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity was denied, and the
355
Citing Alden v. Maine,356 the court of appeals
State appealed.
held that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not extend to ac357
tions brought by the United States in federal courts. The court of
appeals also concluded that the claim could stand because the primary purpose of the equitable apportionment remedy was to reduce the potential damages the plaintiff could recover against the
United States, rather than to create any ongoing legal duty be358
tween the adverse tortfeasors.
359
In Brown v. Ely, the supreme court affirmed the dismissal of
Brown’s federal civil rights claim, reversed the denial of Brown’s
motion to amend his complaint, and vacated the award of attor360
ney’s fees. While investigating a game violation, officers of the
Fish and Wildlife Protection department and the Hoonah City Po361
lice department visited Brown’s house and smelled marijuana.
After obtaining a search warrant, the officers returned to Brown’s
362
house but did not find any marijuana or drug paraphernalia.
Brown was charged with misconduct involving a controlled sub363
Brown subsequently
stance, but the charge was later dropped.
filed a complaint alleging that the search violated his right to pri364
vacy and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure. However, because the right to possess marijuana, which Brown alleged
was protected under state law, is prohibited by federal law, the
court held that the officers had probable cause and therefore the
365
search was not illegal under the Fourth Amendment. In addition,
the court construed Alaska Civil Rule 15(c) broadly to allow
Brown to amend his complaint to include a malicious prosecution
claim against the Hoonah Chief of Police, because the claim arose
out of the same conduct and facts alleged in the original com366
plaint. Finally, the court vacated the award of attorney’s fees and

354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.

See id. at 1173.
See id.
527 U.S. 706 (1999).
See Bethel Native Corp., 208 F.3d at 1173.
See id. at 1176-77.
14 P.3d 257 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 264.
See id. at 258.
See id. at 259.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 260.
See id. at 262-63.
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directed that, on remand, the award should not include any fees incurred in defending the civil rights claim.367
In O’Callaghan v. Divisions of Elections,368 the supreme court
affirmed the superior court’s order denying O’Callaghan’s challenge to emergency regulations by the Division of Elections (the
“Division”) that temporarily adopted a partially closed ballot primary election in place of the blanket primary election prescribed in
369
Alaska Statutes section 15.25.060. The court had previously invalidated such emergency regulations, holding that Alaska Statutes
370
section 15.25.060 was constitutional. However, it had also previously determined that the Division would have authority to “abrogate a statute that is clearly unconstitutional under a United States
Supreme Court decision dealing with similar law, without having to
wait for another court decision specifically declaring the statute un371
constitutional.” Because the United States Supreme Court held
that a similar blanket primary statute in California violated the
First Amendment, and because there were no constitutionally significant differences between the California and Alaska statutes, the
court concluded that Alaska Statutes section 15.25.060 was unconstitutional, and that the Division had authority to abrogate the
372
The court also
statute and promulgate emergency regulations.
held the partially closed primary did not impermissibly infringe
373
upon the Alaska Constitution’s voting secrecy clause.
VI. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Constitutional Protections
1. Search and Seizure. In Beavers v. State,374 the supreme
court held that a confession in a criminal case is involuntary, and
hence inadmissible, if partially induced by a police officer’s threat
375
of harsher treatment. The court vacated Beavers’ indictment for
first-degree robbery, reversing a court of appeals ruling that found
Beavers’ confession voluntary under the “totality of the circum-

367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

See id. at 263-64.
6 P.3d 728 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 730.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 731-32.
998 P.2d 1040 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 1041.
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stances.”376 Beavers confessed to the crime after two Alaska State
Troopers asked Beavers to enter the troopers’ vehicle and give
377
them information about two Anchorage robberies. The troopers’
threat to Beavers that he would be “hammered” if he attempted to
hide his conduct from the trooper and that “we’re going to have to
talk about that” conveyed a strong message that Beavers would be
punished, and could not fully exercise his constitutional right to si378
lence. The court held that a law enforcement officer’s threat of
harsher than normal treatment, in whatever words, sends a message to criminal suspects that they will be punished for their si379
lence. Since there was no evidence affirmatively indicating that
the suspect’s will was not overcome by the threats, Beavers’ confession was involuntary and could not be used against him in his
380
criminal trial.
381
In Jones v. State, the court of appeals overturned a conviction for possession of a controlled substance because the drug evi382
dence was obtained as a result of an unlawful investigative stop.
Anchorage police responded to a 911 call concerning an argument
383
When the officers atbetween Everett Jones and his landlord.
tempted to ask Jones what happened, Jones began to walk away
384
from the officers. After Jones ignored repeated requests to keep
his hands away from his pockets, the officers restrained him, and
385
ultimately handcuffed him when he began to resist. The officers
386
searched Jones and found cocaine. Jones was convicted of pos387
The court held that the
session of cocaine and resisting arrest.
police could not lawfully restrain Jones at the scene of the dis388
pute. Although the police knew that Jones was involved in a dispute with his landlord, they “had no indication that Jones had as389
saulted the landlord or had committed any illegal act.”
Accordingly, there was no basis to require Jones to stay at the
scene, and therefore, the cocaine was seized as the result of an ille376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.

See id.
See id.
Id. at 1047.
See id. at 1046.
See id. at 1047.
11 P.3d 998 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
See id. at 999.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 999-1000.
See id. at 1000.
See id.
See id. at 1000-01.
Id. at 1000.
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gal investigative stop.390 The court held that Jones’ conviction for
resisting arrest would be upheld if the State proved on remand that
“the police were arresting Jones, that Jones knew the officers were
arresting him, and that Jones used force with the intent to prevent
391
the officers from making the arrest.”
392
In Lewis v. State, the court of appeals affirmed all but one of
Lewis’ felony drug convictions that resulted from evidence found
pursuant to a search warrant that had originally been obtained to
393
search for evidence of a Fish and Game Department violation.
The warrant authorized the police to search for evidence of the
394
game violation, including an assault rifle and ammunition. Lewis
moved to suppress the obtained evidence, arguing that the affidavit
in support of the search warrant did not establish probable cause
395
that he was the person who committed the game violation. The
superior court judge agreed that the evidence was insufficient to es396
tablish probable cause with respect to the game violation. However, the judge concluded that the warrant should be upheld because there was probable cause to believe that Lewis had violated a
condition of his probation by possessing a firearm and that evi397
dence of this offense would be found at his residence. The judge
held, and the court of appeals affirmed, that even if the warrant
improperly states the crime under investigation, it will still be upheld if it establishes probable cause to search a particular place for
398
The court of appeals rethe evidence named in the warrant.
versed Lewis’ conviction for possession of firearms during the
commission of a felony drug offense because the state failed to
prove a nexus between his possession of the weapon and his com399
mission of the felony drug offense.
400
In Murray v. State, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court’s conviction of Murray for several offenses involving drug
possession, but vacated a conviction for second-degree misconduct
involving use of a weapon and remanded the case for further con-

390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.

See id.
Id. at 1001.
9 P.3d 1028 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
See id. at 1028-31.
See id. at 1032.
See id. at 1031.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1033-34.
See id. at 1038.
12 P.3d 784 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
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sideration of that count.401 On August 13, 1997, the police received
an anonymous call reporting that there was a dead body in Room
402
When the police arrived at the
222 of an Anchorage motel.
403
room, Murray let them in to search it. Murray was never advised
of his Miranda rights, and, during questioning, he admitted that he
had used drugs and was on probation for a prior drug offense.
Murray also mentioned that his girlfriend, Jeannie Joy, was out
404
driving his car in search of cocaine. After finding Joy, the officers
405
obtained Murray’s consent to search the car. Joy told the officers
that there was marijuana in the car and that Murray owned a fire406
The officers then questioned Murray again, who initially
arm.
agreed to let them search his home, but then refused to sign a con407
sent-to-search form. The police returned with a search warrant
and found, inter alia, a bag containing six ounces of marijuana and
408
a loaded handgun.
Murray contested the admissibility of evidence acquired in the
motel room, including his own statements; he also filed a motion to
quash the search warrant (and the evidence obtained from the
search of his residence) on the grounds that, without his motel
room statements, the remaining evidence was not sufficient to sup409
The superior court held that Murray had conport a warrant.
sented to the search of the motel room, and thus admitted the
physical evidence; however, the court held that Murray’s motel
room statements could be suppressed since he was not given his
Miranda warning. Nevertheless, the court did not quash the search
410
warrant. The court of appeals agreed that Murray did consent to
the search of the motel room and that Murray further consented to
the search of the car; thus, the search warrant was supported by
411
probable cause. Evidence later found in the car and in Murray’s
residence was not derived from statements made during a possible
412
Miranda violation. The court of appeals, therefore, affirmed the
drug convictions. As to the count of second-degree weapons mis-

401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.

See id. at 795.
See id. at 787.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 787-88.
See id.
See id. at 788.
See id.
See id. at 789, 792-93.
See id. at 791.
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conduct, the court of appeals held that the State must show a nexus
between a defendant’s possession of a firearm and the commission
413
of a felony drug offense.
In Shearer v. Municipality of Anchorage,414 the court of appeals
held that a motorist suspected of driving while intoxicated
(“DWI”) continued to pose a potential imminent danger to the
driving public, even though he had parked his car in his driveway
415
and exited his vehicle. A police officer testified that he watched
Daniel Shearer’s Jeep move back and forth between traffic lanes
416
and pass vehicles at a high rate of speed. The police officer testified that, based on his training and experience, his impression was
417
that the driver of the Jeep was intoxicated. Shearer’s motion to
suppress the evidence obtained after his initial contact with the of418
ficer was denied. On the basis of a breath test that exceeded the
419
Shearer appealed
legal limit, Shearer pled no contest to DWI.
420
Shearer
the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence.
claimed that because he parked his Jeep in his driveway, exited the
vehicle, and was headed towards his home when the police officer
contacted him, the officer had no basis to reasonably suspect that
Shearer continued to pose an imminent danger to the motoring
421
public. The court held that the police officer had reasonable suspicion, based on his observations of Shearer’s driving, that Shearer
422
Although Shearer
posed an imminent danger to public safety.
claimed he was home for the night, the court found that there was
nothing to prevent Shearer from going inside his house, coming
423
back out, and driving again.
2. Miscellaneous. In Alexander v. Municipality of Anchor424
age, the court of appeals upheld Alexander’s conviction for driving while intoxicated, finding that the police had not interfered
425
with his right to consult with his attorney. Alexander was taken
to the police substation for a breath test after being arrested for
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.

See id. at 794.
4 P.3d 336 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
See id. at 340.
See id. at 337.
See id.
See id. at 338.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 340.
See id.
15 P.3d 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
See id. at 269.
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driving while intoxicated (“DWI”).426 Pursuant to policy, the police
427
officer kept Alexander’s hands handcuffed behind his back.
When Alexander could not hold the telephone between his ear and
428
his shoulder, the police officer held the phone for him. Alexander claimed that the police officer’s proximity interfered with his
429
right to speak privately with his attorney. Additionally, although
the police officer had turned off the substation’s tape recorder, he
430
had not turned off his personal tape recorder. Although the trial
court excluded evidence of the tape recorded conversation, it did
431
The decision of the trial
not suppress the breath test results.
court was affirmed, because Alexander could not show that his
conversation with his attorney was harmed by the police officer recording the conversation, and because the police officer had made
an effort to allow Alexander to hold the phone between his ear and
432
shoulder.
In Bushnell v. State,433 the court of appeals held that Alaska
Statutes section 28.40.060 did not violate due process in a driving
while intoxicated (“DWI”) case based on test results obtained by
434
an instrument with a working tolerance of .01 percent. Following
a jury trial, Albert Bushnell was convicted of felony DWI on the
435
basis of a breath test. The court of appeals upheld the conviction,
finding that a working tolerance of .01 percent of a properly calibrated instrument was “tolerably inaccurate” under Alaska Stat436
The court rejected an interpretation of
utes section 28.40.060.
section 28.40.060 that would require the State to prove the driver’s
blood actually contained at least .10 percent alcohol by weight or at
437
least .10 grams of alcohol per 210 liters. In light of the history of
the chemical test (the “Intoximeter”) in Alaska cases and its established working tolerance, the court found that the legislature implicitly decided that a .01 percent working tolerance was “tolerably
inaccurate,” and, therefore, irrelevant to the driver’s guilt under
438
Alaska Statutes section 28.35.030(a)(2). The court also held that
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.

See id. at 269-70.
See id. at 270.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 271-72.
5 P.3d 889 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
See id. at 890.
See id.
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section 28.40.060’s exemption for those aged fourteen to twentyone who are charged under another statute does not violate Bushnell’s state and federal rights to equal protection because minors
439
are in fact subject to a stricter law under the exemption.
B. General Criminal Law
440
1. Criminal Procedure. In Dodds v. State, the court of appeals held that the trial court did not err by failing to have the jury
decide whether the State had proved the corpus delicti of a robbery
441
charge. Ian Dodds appealed his conviction for first-degree robbery, claiming that the trial judge committed plain error when he
neglected to tell the jury that they could not convict Dodds unless
the State presented substantial independent evidence tending to es442
tablish that Dodds was, in fact, one of the robbers. The court of
443
appeals disagreed. The court held that, when trying to prove a
defendant has violated a criminal statute, the corpus delicti rule
only requires the State to introduce independent evidence of the
occurrence of the injury, loss, or other harm specified in the statute, not independent evidence of the defendant’s participation in
444
causing this injury, loss, or harm. The trial raised no issue of corpus delicti, because the occurrence of the robbery was not seriously
445
contested. The court further held that juries do not decide the issue of corpus delicti, therefore no corpus delicti instruction was
446
necessary.
447
In Flanigan v. State, the court of appeals held that a state
statutory time limit on a prisoner’s petition for post-conviction relief did not violate the state constitution clause barring suspension
448
More than twelve years after his
of the writ of habeas corpus.
conviction for murder, Flanigan filed an application for postconviction relief, which was dismissed by the trial court because it
was filed after the deadline date mandated by Alaska Statutes sec449
Although the prisoner argued that the time bar
tion 12.72.020.

439.
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443.
444.
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448.
449.

See id. at 892-93.
997 P.2d 536 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
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violated federal and state constitutional prohibitions on suspending
the writ of habeas corpus, the court of appeals held that the United
States Constitution limited only the federal government’s power to
450
The court of appeals held that the writ prosuspend the writ.
tected by the state constitution’s suspension clause was the same in
scope as the writ at common law, which was limited to testing the
451
jurisdiction of the sentencing court. Dismissal of the petition was
proper, because the prisoner’s claim for relief did not challenge the
452
The court of appeals also held
sentencing court’s jurisdiction.
that the prisoner’s inability to access the Alaska Statutes did not
qualify the prisoner for relief, because he was not “physically pre453
vented” from filing a timely petition.
454
In Grinols v. State, the court of appeals held that, because
Alaska grants a right to counsel during post-conviction relief proceedings, a defendant may be entitled to relief for incompetent
455
counsel. In challenging the competency of an attorney in such a
proceeding, a defendant must prove: (1) “their [sic] own diligence
in raising the claim of ineffective representation”; (2) “the incompetence of their [sic] prior post-conviction relief attorney”; (3)
“that the omitted legal issue is, in fact, meritorious—that if the underlying issue had been litigated, the defendant would have won”;
and (4) “there is a reasonable possibility that the outcome of the
defendant’s original trial court proceedings would have been dif456
ferent.” The court held that a defendant is not entitled to an at457
torney for a second petition for post-conviction relief. However,
458
the trial court may appoint counsel in individual cases. In addition, the court affirmed the constitutionality of Civil Rule 86(m),
which provides that post-conviction relief is the procedural method
for collaterally attacking a criminal conviction and upheld the constitutionality, with limited exceptions, of Alaska Statutes section
12.72.020(a)(6), which bars multiple petitions for post-conviction
459
relief.

450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.

See id. at 374.
See id. at 375-76.
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In Hertz v. State,460 the supreme court affirmed the superior
court’s order that directed Hertz to refile his complaint for habeas
461
corpus as a request for post-conviction relief. Alaska Civil Rule
86(m) governs habeas corpus procedures and provides that the rule
“does not apply to any post-conviction proceeding that could be
462
brought under Criminal Rule 35.1.” Hertz argued that his application for habeas corpus could not be brought under Criminal Rule
35.1 because his application was subject to dismissal under Alaska
463
Therefore, Civil Rule 86(m) did
Statutes section 12.72.020(a).
not apply because his complaint would be dismissed as an applica464
tion for post-conviction relief. However, because Hertz’ application alleged a constitutionally based claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, the complaint could be brought under Alaska Criminal
465
Rule 35.1 and Civil Rule 86(m) applied. Hertz also argued that
he should be able to maintain his habeas corpus action and not be
subject to the statutory bars in Alaska Statutes section
466
12.72.020(a). However, because Hertz was not claiming that his
original conviction was void, he could not seek redress in habeas
corpus and his complaint was subject to the limitations of the stat467
ute.
In Howarth v. State,468 the court of appeals held that the superior court abused its discretion in dismissing a petition for post469
conviction relief where there were signs of attorney neglect. William Howarth was found guilty of second-degree murder, but filed
470
The superior court apa petition for post-conviction relief.
471
pointed an attorney to represent Howarth. The State moved to
dismiss, arguing that Howarth’s claims were barred and did not es472
tablish a case. The superior court dismissed the petition for postconviction relief because the court-appointed attorney failed to file
473
a response. The court of appeals reversed because the superior
court dismissed the petition without demanding a response to the
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.

8 P.3d 1144 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 1145.
Id. at 1146.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1147.
See id. at 1148.
See id. at 1148-49.
13 P.3d 754 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
See id. at 754.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 754-55.
See id. at 755-56.
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motion to dismiss.474 The court should not have dismissed the petition until the suggestion of ineffective counsel was “dispelled – or,
if it is not dispelled, until a new attorney is appointed and has a
meaningful opportunity to aid Howarth in reformulating his peti475
tion for post-conviction relief.”
476
In Lonis v. State, the court of appeals held that the trial court
erred by ordering forfeiture of a defendant’s bond based on the defendant’s failure to abide by his conditions of release, but upheld
the trial court’s decision to bar defendant from personally addressing the jury and making him pay restitution to the victim’s in477
surance company. The defendant Michael Lonis, along with his
son, was driving a pickup truck when Lonis lost control of the
478
truck. The truck crashed into the home of Wes and Helen Allen,
479
After the
causing injuries to Mrs. Allen’s neck and stomach.
480
crash, Lonis backed out of the Allen’s house and drove away.
Lonis, who appeared to arm himself with a rifle, threatened to kill
481
police officers when they arrived at his apartment. A grand jury
indicted Lonis for two counts of assault in the third-degree for
threatening the police officers, two counts of assault in the thirddegree for injuring his son and Mrs. Allen in the truck accident,
one count of driving while intoxicated, and one count of failing to
482
give immediate notice of an accident to the police. After the trial
court found that Lonis had violated the conditions of his bail re483
lease, the judge ordered forfeiture of $4500 of Lonis’ $5000 bond.
The court of appeals overturned the judge’s ruling and ordered the
484
The court held that Alaska Statutes
money returned to Lonis.
section 12.30.060 authorizes a court to seize pledged bail money
when the defendant willfully fails to appear, but does not give
courts the authority to seize a defendant’s bail when the defendant
485
However,
fails to comply with the other conditions of release.
the trial court did not err in refusing to let Lonis address the jury at
the end of the case because, in a case where Lonis chose not to tes-

474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.

See id. at 756.
Id. at 757.
998 P.2d 441 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
See id. at 443.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 444.
See id. at 445.
See id. at 444.
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tify, it would be unfair to have Lonis address the jury and give him
some of the benefits of testifying without being subject to cross486
examination. Finally, the court ruled that Lonis had no standing
to complain that the trial court ordered the restitution be paid di487
rectly to the insurance company instead of through the Allens.
488
In Mullin v. State, the court of appeals reversed the superior
court’s decision to dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief on
489
the ground that it was filed too late. Mullin filed a petition for
post-conviction relief exactly three days before the deadline im490
posed by the statute of limitations. However, the superior court
clerk’s office did not accept the petition because Mullin had not included the $100 filing fee or, in the alternative, an application for
491
exemption from the fee. The clerk’s office notified Mullin of the
omission, and Mullin filed the exemption application several weeks
492
later, after the deadline had passed. The superior court dismissed
493
the petition, finding that it was not filed in time. The court of appeals determined that Mullin’s initial, though technically incom494
plete, filing of the petition satisfied the statute of limitations. The
court of appeals reinstated Mullin’s petition and remanded it to the
495
superior court for renewed proceedings.
496
In Schumacher v. State, the court of appeals affirmed Schumacher’s conviction for six felony counts of sexual abuse of his
497
three sons and the resulting composite sentence of fifteen years.
On appeal, Schumacher argued that the court should have dis498
missed his indictment because his sons’ testimony was unreliable.
Because he did not raise the objection before trial, the court held
499
For the same reasons,
that the objection had been waived.
Schumacher argued that the court should have declared a mistrial
500
or conducted a “taint hearing.” However, because judges could
differ about the need for a taint hearing, the trial judge did not err
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.

See id. at 447.
See id. at 448.
996 P.2d 737 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
See id. at 740.
See id. at 738.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 740.
See id.
11 P.3d 397 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
See id. at 402.
See id. at 399.
See id.
See id.
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when he did not order one.501 Next, Schumacher argued that the
trial court erred when it allowed a detective to demonstrate how
502
Schumacher wiped his groin area in the detective’s presence. The
court held that permitting the detective to demonstrate his personal observations was not an abuse of discretion because Schumacher’s defense raised the issue of whether he had the physical
503
ability to reach his groin area. In addition, Schumacher argued
that the trial court erred when it did not allow Schumacher to per504
form his own demonstration without taking the stand. The court
held that the judge did not err by disallowing the demonstration
because the demonstration would show a voluntary range of motion that could be manipulated rather than a physical characteris505
tic. Lastly, Schumacher argued that his sentence of fifteen years
506
However, because the term was in the upper
was excessive.
range of the benchmark sentence and because his crimes were aggravated, the court held that the sentence was not clearly mis507
taken.
In State v. Roberts,508 the court of appeals held that Alaska
Statutes section 12.30.027 forbids a trial court from permitting a
person released on a charge or conviction of a crime involving do509
mestic violence to return to the residence of his alleged victim.
Lincoln Roberts was convicted of third-degree assault for assault510
ing M.J., with whom he lived and had a domestic relationship.
Following Roberts’ initial release on bail during the pendency of
his appeal, Roberts was granted a modification on his release conditions so that he could reside in the same residence with the as511
sault victim. After the court of appeals granted the petition for
review, Roberts moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that it
was moot because Roberts had violated his conditions of release
512
and was in custody. The court of appeals declined to dismiss the
case, arguing that the case fell within the public interest exception
513
to the mootness doctrine. On the merits, the court relied on leg501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.
513.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 400.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 401.
See id. at 401-02.
999 P.2d 151 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
See id. at 152.
See id.
See id. at 152-53.
See id. at 153.
See id.
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islative intent to hold that the statute prevented courts from releasing to the residence of the alleged victim defendants charged
514
with or convicted of a crime of domestic violence.
515
In United States v. Hinojosa-Perez, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the defendant’s conviction for reentering the United States after deportation, because the defendant
failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available for attack516
ing the original deportation order. In an order instituting deportation proceedings, the defendant was informed of his obligation to
provide any changes in his address to the office of the Immigration
517
Judge in charge of his case. After his deportation hearing, the defendant appealed the denial of his request to depart the country
518
The defendant continued to correspond with the
voluntarily.
agency handling his appeal but failed to notify the agency when he
519
moved to a new address. Although he prevailed on appeal, the
defendant did not appear at his remand hearing and was de520
ported. The defendant was again deported after reentering the
United States the following year, and after he reentered the coun521
try a second time, he was charged with the corresponding felony.
The defendant moved to dismiss, alleging a due process violation
because he did not receive notice of his original deportation re522
He appealed from the district court’s refusal to
mand hearing.
dismiss and reasserted the collateral challenge to his deportation
523
order. The court of appeals decided that the defendant had notice of his obligation to inform the State of any address changes,
and because he failed to do so, he had constructive notice of the
remand hearing and the possibility of appealing the deportation
524
order. The court held that because the defendant did not contest
the order, he had not exhausted his administrative remedies and
525
was now barred from contesting the order in his criminal case.
526
In Wardlow v. State, the court of appeals affirmed the conviction of a defendant who alleged that he was denied his right to a
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.
525.
526.

See id. at 154-55.
206 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2000).
See id. at 833.
See id.
See id. at 833-34.
See id. at 834.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 835.
See id. at 835-37.
See id.
2 P.3d 1238 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
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speedy trial and that certain evidence against him had been admitted erroneously.527 Wardlow was convicted of second-degree as528
sault, two counts of first-degree sexual assault, and kidnapping.
Wardlow appealed the conviction, claiming that he had been denied the right to a speedy trial as provided in Alaska Civil Rule
529
45. Under that rule, Wardlow’s trial was to have commenced by
September 8, 1997, but scheduling conflicts delayed the beginning
530
Wardlow’s attorney agreed
of the trial by more than a week.
with the prosecutor to reschedule the trial. Wardlow signed a writ531
ten waiver of Civil Rule 45, but then repudiated the waiver. The
court of appeals held that, even if Wardlow had not signed the
waiver, Rule 45 was waived when Wardlow’s attorney joined the
532
prosecutor’s motion to set the trial at a later date. The court of
appeals also held that the trial judge’s decision to allow evidence of
Wardlow’s prior assault on another woman was consistent with
533
legislative intent and did not violate the rules of evidence. Evidence of prior assaults is admissible to establish a defendant’s propensity to sexually assault women when the defendant raises a de534
fense of consent. The court of appeals also affirmed Wardlow’s
composite sentence of sixty years, given the aggravating nature of
535
the criminal acts.
536

2. Evidence. In Ashley v. State, the court of appeals affirmed a reckless driving conviction, unpersuaded by the appellant’s argument that his conviction was supported by insufficient
537
evidence. The court of appeals held that although the conviction
was based almost entirely on circumstantial evidence, the evidence
was sufficient to convince a reasonable person that Ashley was
538
guilty of reckless driving. The court also gave weight to the fact
that Ashley testified in court and failed to convince the jury that his
539
was the correct explanation for how the accident occurred. The
court of appeals held that the two charges of reckless driving and
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.
536.
537.
538.
539.

See id. at 1254.
See id. at 1241.
See id. at 1243.
See id. at 1242-43.
See id. at 1243.
See id. at 1244.
See id. at 1247.
See id. at 1248.
See id. at 1254.
6 P.3d 738 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
See id. at 738, 744.
See id. at 744.
See id.
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failure to report an accident had been properly joined because they
arose out of the same accident and because their joinder did not
540
unfairly prejudice Ashley. Furthermore, the court concluded that
Ashley had waived his evidentiary objections with respect to the
police officer’s testimony, because he did not raise them during the
541
trial.
In Lowe v. State,542 the court of appeals affirmed the superior
543
court’s conviction of Lowe for tampering with evidence. Robert
Meyer was charged with the murder of his wife and daughter and
544
the arson of his boat. After Meyer reported his boat was on fire
and his wife and daughter were missing, he went to Ann Lowe’s
home, where Lowe proceeded to wash his clothing, which smelled
545
heavily of diesel fuel. When the police arrived at Lowe’s home,
they advised her, in a tape recorded conversation, not to wash
546
Meyer’s clothing any further than she already had. Lowe moved
to dismiss her indictment due to the State’s failure to present ex547
The trial
culpatory evidence—the tape recorded conversation.
judge concluded that the prosecutor’s questioning of the police officer did not substantially deviate from the taped conversation, and
548
Lowe also argued that the
therefore affirmed her indictment.
evidence of Meyer’s guilt was highly prejudicial and allowed the
549
jury to speculate as to her own guilt. The judge, however, ruled
that the State could present a “foundational basis for this investiga550
tion.” The court of appeals found that all of the judge’s findings
551
were supported by the record and affirmed the conviction.
552
In McCormick v. Municipality of Anchorage, the court of
appeals upheld the trial court’s decision to admit evidence that the
defendant refused to perform two additional field sobriety tests in
553
John McCormick
a Driving While Intoxicated (“DWI”) case.
was asked to perform field sobriety tests by a police officer follow-

540.
541.
542.
543.
544.
545.
546.
547.
548.
549.
550.
551.
552.
553.

See id. at 740-41.
See id. at 738.
No. A-7387, No. 4318, 2000 Alas. App. LEXIS 197, at *1 (Dec. 13, 2000).
See id. at *2.
See id. at *1.
See id. at *2-3.
See id.
See id. at *5.
See id. at *6.
See id. at *10.
Id. at *8.
See id. at *14.
999 P.2d 155 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
See id. at 158-59.
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ing a traffic accident.554 McCormick submitted to the first sobriety
test, and after refusing to perform two additional tests, he was ar555
McCormick later rerested for driving under the influence.
quested and obtained an independent blood test at a local hospital,
which was sent to a laboratory in Colorado without the Municipal556
ity’s knowledge. When the Municipality sought a blood sample,
it obtained a court order directing the hospital to surrender any
557
The Muunused blood to the Municipality for further testing.
nicipality introduced evidence at trial that McCormick had refused
to perform the latter two field sobriety tests, and that the blood ob558
tained from the hospital yielded a result of .125 percent alcohol.
The court of appeals held that the government can introduce evidence of, and comment on, a motorist’s refusal to perform field sobriety tests after the motorist is stopped validly on suspicion of
559
driving while intoxicated. In addition, the court held that the trial
court acted lawfully when it ordered McCormick’s attorney to surrender the unused portion of the blood sample to the Municipal560
ity. Lastly, the court held that the mandatory forfeiture provision
of Anchorage Municipal Code section 9.28.020(C)(5) does not
violate state law because Alaska Statutes section 28.35.038 authorizes municipalities to enact vehicle impoundment and vehicle for561
feiture laws that are harsher than their state-law counterparts.
Forfeiture of a $5000 vehicle was not so grossly disproportionate to
the repeat offense of driving while intoxicated as to represent an
562
“excessive fine” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
563
In Napoka v. State, the court of appeals reversed the conviction of rape and granted a new trial because the court found that
the trial court had improperly excluded relevant evidence that the
defendant and the alleged victim had repeatedly engaged in con564
sensual sex. The defendant, who was charged with three counts
of first-degree sexual assault, sought to introduce evidence of pre565
vious consensual sexual encounters with the alleged victim. Un-

554.
555.
556.
557.
558.
559.
560.
561.
562.
563.
564.
565.

See id. at 157.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 158-59.
See id. at 163.
See id. at 168.
See id. at 169.
996 P.2d 106 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
See id. at 112.
See id. at 107.
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der the state’s rape shield law, Alaska Statutes section 12.45.045,
evidence of a rape victim’s previous sexual conduct is not admissible at trial, unless the trial judge determines that the probative
value of the evidence outweighs the potential for undue preju566
dice. The court of appeals noted that the wording of the statute,
by failing to distinguish between past sexual activity in general and
specific sexual acts that may be related to the case at bar, does not
567
describe its purpose. The victim’s past sexual behavior in general
should not be introduced in a criminal rape proceeding because it is
irrelevant, especially where it concerns the victim’s sexual contacts
with individuals other than the defendant; however, the court
maintained that, if the evidence of previous sexual conduct is rele568
vant in a given case, then it should be admitted. Concluding that
the trial judge should have admitted the potentially exculpatory
evidence, the court of appeals reversed the rape conviction and or569
dered a new trial.
In Seaman v. State,570 the court of appeals found that the trial
court did not err when it denied Seaman’s motion to suppress a
571
conversation obtained without a warrant. Seaman was convicted
of third-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance for
572
The informant,
delivering cocaine to an undercover informant.
573
who was wired to a tape recorder, had a Glass warrant to record a
conversation between the informant and Michael Bridge, a sus574
pected cocaine dealer, but Seaman was not named in the warrant.
Seaman then showed up in lieu of Bridge to deliver the cocaine and
575
the conversation was recorded. The court held that the warrantless recording was justified by exigent circumstances, because there
576
was not sufficient time to secure a new warrant.
577
In Worthy v. State, the supreme court reversed a seconddegree sexual assault conviction and remanded the case for retrial,
holding that the trial court committed reversible error by excluding
evidence of a prior false allegation of sexual assault by the alleged

566.
567.
568.
569.
570.
571.
572.
573.
574.
575.
576.
577.

See id.
See id. at 108.
See id.
See id. at 112.
No. A-7150, No. 4317, 2000 Alas. App. LEXIS 200, at *1 (Dec. 13, 2000).
See id. at *11.
See id. at *3.
State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978).
See Seaman, No. A-7150, No. 4317, 2000 Alas. App. LEXIS 200, at *1.
See id. at *3.
See id. at *10.
999 P.2d 771 (Alaska 2000).
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victim.578 The supreme court determined that the usual rules excluding evidence of prior false allegations of sexual assault were inapplicable because the issue of a prior false allegation of sexual as579
sault was made independently relevant by the State. The State
made the prior assault a fundamental part of its case against the de580
fendant. Therefore, the court held that the defendant was enti581
tled to litigate the truth or falsity of the prior allegation.
3. Sentencing. In Brown v. State,582 the court of appeals reversed Brown’s fifty-five-year sentence and ordered the trial judge
583
to sentence Brown to a term within the benchmark range.
Brown’s sentence upon conviction of second-degree murder was in
584
excess of the twenty to thirty year benchmark range. In a previous decision, the court instructed the trial court to reduce Brown’s
sentence to no more than thirty years because it had not offered
any justification for sentencing Brown to a term above the bench585
mark range. The supreme court ordered the court of appeals to
586
review its decision in light of State v. Hodari, in which the court
warned appellate courts not to “articulate sentencing principles
587
and to fine-tune sentences.” In reviewing Brown’s sentence, the
court emphasized that it rejected the trial judge’s sentence on fac588
tual grounds, not legal grounds. Because the trial judge’s justifications for sentencing Brown to a term above the benchmark were
not supported by the record, the court again reversed Brown’s
fifty-five-year sentence and directed the sentencing judge to sen589
tence Brown to a term not more than the thirty year benchmark.
590
In Clark v. State, the court of appeals held that presumptive
sentencing applies to defendants convicted of felony driving while
591
intoxicated (“DWI”). Johnny Clark drove a motor vehicle while
he was intoxicated in violation of Alaska Statutes section

578.
579.
580.
581.
582.
583.
584.
585.
586.
587.
588.
589.
590.
591.

See id. at 772-73.
See id. at 774.
See id.
See id. at 775.
4 P.3d 961 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 964.
See id. at 962.
See id.
996 P.2d 1230 (Alaska 2000).
Brown, 4 P.3d at 963.
See id. at 964.
See id.
8 P.3d 1149 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
See id. at 1150.
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28.35.030(a).592 Based on Clark’s two prior felonies, the superior
court ruled that Clark was subject to presumptive sentencing under
593
Alaska Statutes section 12.55.125 as a third felony offender.
Since felony DWI is a class C felony, the trial judge ruled that
594
Clark pleaded no
Clark faced a three-year presumptive term.
contest to this charge, and was sentenced to three and a half years
595
On appeal, Clark argued that mandatory miniimprisonment.
mum sentences under section 28.35.030(n) should supplant or supersede the “minimum sentences” contained in the presumptive
596
The court disagreed and held that the presentencing statute.
sumptive terms listed in Alaska Statutes section 12.55.125 are different from, and serve a different purpose than, the mandatory
minimum sentences for felony DWI listed in Alaska Statutes sec597
tion 28.35.030(n). The court affirmed both the presumptive sentencing laws and application of the mandatory minimum sentences
598
established in Alaska Statutes section 28.35.030(n).
599
In Dollison v. State, the court of appeals held that the sentencing court’s failure to consider as a mitigating factor that the defendant possessed only a small quantity of a controlled substance
was harmless error, because the judge had stated that he would not
600
have adjusted the presumptive sentence. The court clarified an
601
earlier ruling setting out the “small quantity” mitigating factor by
stating that the typical drug case against which the quantity should
be measured “is a drug case where the quantity involved in the case
falls in the broad-middle ground penalized by the statute when
considering the nature of the substance, its form, its purity, its
commercial value, and its relative availability or scarcity,” rather
than the typically prosecuted case or the typical case on a judge’s
602
docket. The court also decided that because an arresting officer’s
discovery of a crack pipe during a pat-down search gave him probable cause to believe defendant possessed drugs, the officer could

592.
593.
594.
595.
596.
597.
598.
599.
600.
601.
1993)).
602.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1151.
5 P.3d 244 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
See id. at 248.
See id. (citing Knight v. State, 855 P.2d 1347, 1349-50 (Alaska Ct. App.
Dollison, 5 P.3d at 247-48.
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also legally seize a Tylenol container found in the defendant’s
pocket that might contain evidence of that crime.603
In Fergerson v. State,604 the court of appeals affirmed the superior court’s finding that Fergerson’s sentence was not excessive or
605
clearly mistaken. Fergerson pleaded no contest to a single count
606
He
of second-degree theft for fraudulent use of a credit card.
plea bargained for a thirty-month sentence with twenty-seven
months suspended, conceding two aggravating factors, and he
607
agreed to pay $55,640.87 in restitution. Less than two weeks after
serving this sentence, Fergerson was arrested again for seconddegree theft, a scheme to defraud, and contributing to the delin608
quency of a minor. He again reached a plea agreement with the
State receiving a two-year sentence, and the judge imposed his en609
tire prior twenty-seven month suspended term. The court of appeals reiterated that it reviews sentences under the “clearly mistaken” standard rather than a sentencing de novo or the “principal
610
of parsimony.” The court also found that a probation violation
may indicate a poor prospect for rehabilitation, a finding of which
611
612
could indicate that the sentence may exceed the Austin limit.
Therefore, the superior court’s sentencing above the Austin limit
613
was not excessive or clearly mistaken.
614
In Foley v. State, the supreme court held that the defendant’s
maximum possible sentence was not excessive in light of his nu615
merous prior offenses and repeated failures at rehabilitation.
Foley was observed driving erratically for several minutes before a
616
Before the officer
police officer attempted to pull him over.
617
could do so, Foley ran off the road and stopped in the grass.
Foley subsequently was determined to have a blood-alcohol level
603. See id. at 247.
604. No. A-7499, No. 4319, 2000 Alas. App. LEXIS 199, at *1 (Dec. 13, 2000).
605. See id. at *1.
606. See id. at *2.
607. See id. at *3.
608. See id.
609. See id. at *4-5.
610. See id. at *6.
611. Austin v. State, 627 P.2d 657 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981) (finding that a first
felony offender should normally be sentenced to a lesser sentence than would apply if the defendant were a second felony offender).
612. See Fergerson, No. A-7499, No. 4319, 2000 Alas. App. LEXIS 199, at *1.
613. See id. at *11.
614. 9 P.3d 1038 (Alaska 2000).
615. See id. at 1038.
616. See id. at 1038-40.
617. See id. at 1040.
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of 0.33 percent.618 The sentencing judge considered as aggravating
factors the fact that Foley had thirty criminal convictions in the
619
past twenty-five years, had an extremely high blood-alcohol level,
620
and was driving on a revoked license. The court concluded that
the sentencing judge gave the proper weight to Foley’s past record
621
in finding that he could neither be rehabilitated nor deterred;
thus, the court held that the judge was not clearly mistaken in giv622
ing Foley the maximum sentence for his offense.
623
In Griffin v. State, the court of appeals held that a twentythree-year prison sentence was not excessive when a defendant had
a prior history of theft and a demonstrated tendency toward violent
624
crimes. For at least fifteen years prior to the crimes in question,
625
Griffin had been convicted of various burglaries and felonies. On
June 19, 1998, he committed another burglary, and the trial court
identified aggravating factors for sentencing under Alaska Statutes
section 12.55.155(c), focusing on the seriousness of Griffin’s crimes
626
Although the standard
and his use of a dangerous weapon.
Mutschler rule would only allow Griffin, as a person convicted of
multiple offenses, to receive a sentence equal to the maximum term
for the most serious offense, the trial judge imposed a sentence of
627
twenty-two to twenty-three years. The court of appeals upheld
this sentence based on “Griffin’s long criminal history, the seriousness of Griffin’s current offenses, and the apparent failure of all
628
prior attempts to supervise Griffin on probation and parole.”
Further, the court indicated that, based on the supreme court’s
629
holding in State v. Bumpus, the excessiveness of a sentence depends on the facts in question and in the present case the facts
630
showed that Griffin deserved his punishment.
631
In Harmon v. State, the court of appeals affirmed separate
sentences for appellant’s convictions of second-degree sexual assault and incest because the relevant statutes required proof of dif618.
619.
620.
621.
622.
623.
624.
625.
626.
627.
628.
629.
630.
631.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1042.
See id.
9 P.3d 301 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
See id. at 310.
See id. at 302.
See id. at 307 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c) (LEXIS 2000)).
See id. at 307-08.
Id. at 308.
820 P.2d 298 (Alaska 1991).
See Griffin, 9 P.3d. at 310.
11 P.3d 393 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
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ferent conduct and vindicated different social interests.632 The
court rejected appellant’s argument that the sentencing violated
the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy because the
sexual assault charge required the State to prove that appellant engaged in sexual penetration with a person he knew to be incapacitated, while incest required proof that appellant engaged in sexual
633
The court also affirmed that
penetration with a blood relative.
the trial judge’s finding of a statutory aggravating factor, which requires proof that appellant’s conduct was among the most serious
included in the definition of the offense, was not clearly erroneous
because the appellant assaulted his sister at night while she slept,
and his offense escalated to forcible rape when the sister woke up
634
and appellant choked her into unconsciousness. In addition, the
court did not consider the sentence excessive because of previous
sexual offense convictions and a lack of any statutory mitigating
635
factors.
In State v. Delagarza,636 the court of appeals reversed a grant of
post-conviction relief to petitioner because his prior out-of-state
felony convictions were sufficiently similar to Alaska offenses to
637
Petiqualify as felonies for presumptive sentencing purposes.
tioner had been convicted in Oregon of first-degree burglary, sec638
ond-degree burglary, and twice of second-degree robbery. Under
Alaska Statutes section 12.55.155, an aggravating factor for pre639
sumptive sentencing is having three or more felony convictions.
Pursuant to Alaska Statutes section 12.55.145(a)(1)(B), the appeals
court ruled that first-degree burglary in Oregon was “similar” to
second-degree burglary in Alaska, and that second-degree burglary
640
in both states had elements that were substantially identical. The
petitioner argued that Alaska’s second-degree robbery statute penalized assaultive conduct in the course of taking or attempting to
take property, focusing on a crime against the person, while the
corresponding Oregon statute emphasized theft, the taking of
641
The court rejected this argument by concluding that
property.

632.
633.
634.
635.
636.
637.
638.
639.
640.
2000)).
641.

See id. at 395.
See id.
See id. at 396.
See id.
8 P.3d 362 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
See id. at 368.
See id. at 364.
See id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155 (LEXIS 2000)).
See id. at 365-66 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.145(a)(1)(B) (LEXIS
See id. at 367.
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the legislative history of Oregon’s robbery statutes indicated that
the Oregon legislature also intended to emphasize assault.642 In
comparing the crimes, the court noted that an out-of-state conviction will be treated as a prior felony for presumptive sentencing if
its elements are more restrictive than the corresponding Alaska
statute, and that even if certain conduct would be penalized under
an Oregon statute but not an Alaska statute, that does not prevent
643
a conclusion that the elements of the two statutes are similar.
644
In State v. Hodari, the supreme court upheld the trial court’s
fifty-five-year composite sentence, finding that the court of appeals
improperly relied on sentencing benchmarks as inflexible rules
rather than as starting points to reach its decision to overturn the
645
Hodari was convicted of two counts of
trial court’s sentence.
first-degree sexual assault, one count of first-degree robbery, and
646
The trial judge found that
one count of second-degree assault.
Hodari’s long record of prior offenses and the heinousness of the
crime were aggravating factors that warranted a greater sentence
than forty-four years of “presumptive sentencing” established by
647
Alaska Statutes section 12.55.155. The supreme court found that
648
649
State v. Wentz implicitly rejected Williams v. State’s rigid sentencing benchmarks relied on by the court of appeals, and empha650
sized the importance of the individualized nature of sentencing.
Finally, the supreme court found that Hodari’s case presented a
“truly exceptional confluence of factors” showing in totality “an ingrained compulsive criminal pattern” in his behavior that war651
ranted the trial court’s sentencing decision.
652
In United States v. Scheele, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that the district court’s failure to consider margin of error when it arrived at a quantity of drugs upon which to
base a sentence constituted error, but that the district court did not
err when it applied an obstruction of justice adjustment to the sentence based on the testimony of an officer, who had heard a tape of

642.
643.
644.
645.
646.
647.
648.
649.
650.
651.
652.

See id.
See id. at 366-67.
996 P.2d 1230 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 1237.
See id. at 1232.
See id. at 1233-34 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155 (LEXIS 2000)).
805 P.2d 962 (Alaska 1991).
800 P.2d 955 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990).
See Hodari, 996 P.2d at 1234.
Id. at 1237.
231 F.3d 492 (9th Cir. 2000).
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the defendant threatening a witness.653 Scheele was indicted for
manufacturing, distributing, and attempting to manufacture meth654
amphetamine. The testimony varied as to the amount of drugs
655
Weighing the various statements made
attributable to Scheele.
by Scheele as to the amount of drugs he produced, the judge ar656
rived at a sum of 3040.98 kg. Pursuant to the sentencing guidelines, the amount was just 40.98 kg above the threshold for a base
657
The court of appeals held that, aloffense level of thirty-four.
though the district court made every attempt to be fair in its esti658
mation, it “failed to err on the side of caution.” Since taking the
margin of error into account could have reduced Scheele’s base offense level to the next lowest level, the court of appeals held that
659
the district court’s failure to do so constituted error. Finally, the
court held that the adjustment to the sentence for obstruction of
justice was not erroneous because nothing in the record suggested
that the testimony of the officer was unreliable, and because the
statements made by Scheele were sufficiently threatening to sup660
port such a finding.
661

4. Miscellaneous. In Fuzzard v. State, the court of appeals
held that evidence of prior acts of domestic violence were admissi662
ble under Alaska Rules of Evidence 404(b)(1) and (b)(4). James
663
He was arrested
Fuzzard threatened to kill Bobbi Jo Murphy.
664
and indicted for third-degree assault. Fuzzard asked for a protective order that would prohibit the State from admitting evidence of
665
The
previous episodes of domestic violence against Murphy.
court held that the admission of the prior episodes did not “place
him at unreasonable risk of conviction” because Fuzzard had other
666
opportunities to impeach Murphy’s testimony about these events.
Additionally, the admission of the prior acts comported with the

653.
654.
655.
656.
657.
658.
659.
660.
661.
662.
663.
664.
665.
666.

See id. at 499-500.
See id. at 495.
See id.
See id. at 496-97.
See id.
Id. at 498.
See id. at 499-500.
See id. at 500.
13 P.3d 1163 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
See id. at 1163.
See id. at 1164.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 1167.
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legislative purpose of the rules.667 Fuzzard also argued that the evi668
The court redence rules violated the equal protection clause.
jected this argument because Fuzzard failed to show that the rules
669
infringed on a fundamental right.
670
In Hosier v. State, the court of appeals held that the trial
court did not err by allowing the State to amend an indictment to
conform to the evidence, failing to inform the defendant of a note
received from the jury during trial, and allowing the State to play a
tape recording of an interview between the defendant and police
671
that contained references to the defendant’s prior criminal acts.
The defendant Donald Hosier was convicted on several counts of
second-degree forgery and one count of second-degree theft for
forging another person’s name on several checks drawn from an
672
account at Key Bank. Although Hosier’s indictment mistakenly
identified the bank as “First Bank,” the trial judge allowed the
673
The
State to amend the indictment to name the correct bank.
court of appeals upheld the amendment because the identity of the
674
bank was not a material element of the forgery charge. In addition, the court held that Hosier was not prejudiced by the trial
judge’s failure to inform him of a jury note requesting the prosecutor to speak more slowly and the defense attorney to speak more
675
The court concluded that it was clear from the record
loudly.
that the judge conveyed the jury’s requests to the attorneys, and
that the jury note did not directly involve the merits of the litiga676
tion or the jury’s duties in deciding the case. The court also held
it was not error to admit the tape recording containing Hosier’s
prior criminal acts because the trial judge adequately cautioned the
jury against the potentially objectionable portions of the recording,
677
and Hosier failed to preserve his objection to playing the tape.
678
In Plyler v. State, the court of appeals held that a defendant
who files for post-conviction relief challenging a criminal conviction does not have the right to a peremptory challenge of the judge

667.
668.
669.
670.
671.
672.
673.
674.
675.
676.
677.
678.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 1167-68.
1 P.3d 107 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
See id. at 108.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 109.
See id. at 110.
See id.
See id. at 111-12.
10 P.3d 1173 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
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who presided over the trial.679 Plyler was found guilty of first680
degree murder. He later filed an application for post-conviction
relief, claiming he had received ineffective assistance of counsel,
681
The
and tried to change judges using a peremptory challenge.
court of appeals, relying on other jurisdictions that had considered
similar cases, held that Plyler did not have a right to the peremptory challenge, because the change in judge would foster an unnec682
essary delay. The court held that a new judge would have to become familiar with all the intricacies of the case, and that it would
be difficult for a new judge to determine the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses simply by examining the record of the
683
case.
In Semaken v. State,684 the court of appeals affirmed a conviction of a misdemeanor: failing to make an annual report to the Department of Public Safety, pursuant to Alaska Statutes section
685
12.63.010. Having been convicted in 1990 of sexual assault, Semaken was required to register as a sex offender and annually re686
port his current address and other information. At the time this
case arose, the Department of Public Safety’s regulation required
sex offenders to submit an annual report thirty days prior to their
687
birthday. Semaken was stopped for a traffic violation three days
after his birthday and charged with the misdemeanor of failing to
688
Semaken argued that Alaska Statutes section 12.63.010
report.
requires the Department of Public Safety to establish an individualized annual reporting schedule rather than impose a general
689
rule. The court of appeals disagreed, and, noting that Semaken
had been well aware of the regulation prior to the traffic stop, af690
firmed his conviction.
In Thompson v. State,691 the court of appeals affirmed the ruling of the superior court, which dismissed Thompson’s Rule 33 motion, his appeal for a reduction in sentence, and his motion to ap-

679.
680.
681.
682.
683.
684.
685.
686.
687.
688.
689.
690.
691.

See id. at 1176.
See id. at 1173.
See id. at 1173-74.
See id. at 1174-75.
See id. at 1175.
8 P.3d 368 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
See id. at 370 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.010 (LEXIS 2000)).
See id. at 369.
See id.
See id.
See id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.010 (LEXIS 2000)).
See id. at 369-70.
13 P.3d 276 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
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point counsel.692 Thompson was convicted of first-degree murder
693
694
for killing his ex-wife. In 1996, he sought post-conviction relief.
The court of appeals remanded to the superior court to determine
695
Thompson
whether Thompson was denied the right to testify.
then filed a motion for a new trial under Alaska Criminal Rule
696
33. Thompson’s motion was not timely, and the court dismissed
his motion, along with his motions for reduction of sentence and
697
On appeal, the court concluded
appointment of new counsel.
that Alaska Statutes section 12.72.020 did not apply to Thompson’s
698
motion for a new trial. Further, the court concluded that Thompson did not fall under an exception to the 120-day time limit for
699
Finally, the court held
filing a motion to reduce the sentence.
700
that Thompson’s motion to appoint counsel was untimely.
701
In Ward v. State, the court of appeals upheld the trial court’s
decision to select a jury in Fairbanks rather than renewing its un702
successful efforts to select a jury in Fort Yukon. The defendant
Thomas Ward and his father got into a fight, and the defendant’s
703
ex-girlfriend tried to stop them. During the struggle, Ward hit his
ex-girlfriend in the head with an axe, causing his arrest for as704
Before trial in Fort Yukon, the trial judge made several
sault.
unsuccessful efforts to empanel a sufficient number of jurors to
705
hear the case. The trial judge decided not to attempt to contact
the potential jurors that did not respond to the summons or the radio messages, and instead elected to return the case to Fairbanks
706
for jury selection. After a trial in Fairbanks with a new judge and
707
The court of
jury, Ward was convicted of third-degree assault.
appeals affirmed Ward’s conviction, finding that the trial judge un708
dertook reasonable efforts to obtain a jury in Fort Yukon. The
692.
693.
694.
695.
696.
697.
698.
699.
700.
701.
702.
703.
704.
705.
706.
707.
708.

See id. at 278.
See id. at 276.
See id. at 277.
See id. at 277-78.
See id. at 278.
See id.
See id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 12.72.020 (LEXIS 2000)).
See id.
See id.
997 P.2d 528 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
See id.
See id. at 528-29.
See id.
See id. at 529.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 531-32.

YIR_FMT.DOC

2001]

04/24/01 12:03 PM

THE YEAR IN REVIEW

129

court found that although it might have been possible to locate additional prospective jurors to complete jury selection, the process
undertaken revealed widespread familial and personal relationships between the prospective jurors and the participants in the alleged assault, and that the jury pool had extensive knowledge of
709
the incident itself. The court upheld the trial court’s ruling to reject Ward’s proposed jury instructions on transferred intent and
710
self-defense because they were superfluous.
VII. EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. Discrimination
711
In Era Aviation, Inc. v. Lindfors, the supreme court affirmed
a jury verdict against Era Aviation (“Era”) for discrimination and
retaliation in a case where a female pilot alleged sex discrimination
712
and retaliation after she filed a human rights violation complaint.
The court held that although the jury instruction was erroneously
worded for this type of discrimination case, the jury instruction was
713
Addiequally favorable to Era as the one Era had requested.
tionally, because the jury instruction did not prejudice Era, it did
714
The court held that separate
not constitute reversible error.
submission of discrimination, retaliation, and constructive discharge claims was appropriate, and the fact that the jury rejected
715
the constructive discharge claim did not impact the other claims.
The court also held that testimony offered by another employee
about the conduct of an officer was appropriately admitted because
there was “sufficient circumstantial evidence for the jury to infer
that Birmingham was one of the decisionmakers in Era’s retaliation
716
The court further found that the punitive
against Lindfors.”
damages award of $750,000 was excessive and remanded the case
717
for remittitur to $500,000. The court held it was appropriate for
the jury to determine whether Lindfors qualified as a professional
under the Alaska Wage and Hour Act for purposes of determining
718
whether overtime pay was due. The court concluded that a risk
709.
710.
711.
712.
713.
714.
715.
716.
717.
718.

See id. at 531.
See id. at 532.
17 P.3d 40 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 52.
See id. at 46.
See id.
See id. at 47.
Id. at 48.
See id. at 49.
See id. at 50.
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enhancement or lodestar multiplier was not required, because
Lindfors had neither shown she was a public interest plaintiff nor
that her attorneys would not be compensated beyond the fees
719
awarded by the court.
B. Labor Law
In Alaska Contracting & Consulting, Inc. v. Department of La720
bor, the supreme court held that the Department of Labor (the
“Department”) had authority to determine that a contracting company was a “liable employer” under the Alaska Employment Security Act, notwithstanding a prior determination, and that the Department’s liability determination was supported by substantial
721
The Alaska Employment Security Act requires emevidence.
ployers to pay contributions to the Department for an unemployment compensation fund each year that the employers are subject
722
to the Act. Alaska Contracting engages in “lease-back” operations whereby “lease-drivers” operate the company’s equipment to
723
perform certain duties in construction projects. In 1996, Department Hearing Officer Jenkins ruled that Alaska Contracting was
liable under the Act for contributions after April 1, 1993, despite a
724
1990 notice of “non-liability.” The supreme court held that the
1996 ruling was not barred by collateral estoppel because the issue
725
was not actually litigated, which is a prerequisite for preclusion.
The supreme court also held that Alaska Statutes section
23.20.315(a) authorizes the Department to “determine coverage for
a new period, even if its new coverage determination differs from a
726
previous coverage determination.” Further, no new evidence was
required under Alaska Statutes section 23.20.315(b) to redetermine
a Department ruling, because the “1996 liability ruling decided
Alaska Contracting’s coverage status and liability for new tax peri727
Fiods not covered by the 1990 non-liability determination.”
nally, the supreme court held that the Department did not err in
finding Alaska Contracting liable as a employer, because the leasedrivers provided a “service” to Alaska Contracting, and because
Alaska Contracting was not exempt under the three-part “ABC
719.
720.
721.
722.
723.
724.
725.
726.
727.

See id. at 50-51.
8 P.3d 340 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 351.
See id. at 342.
See id. at 343.
See id. at 344.
See id. at 345.
Id. at 346 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 23.20.315(a) (LEXIS 2000)).
Id. at 347 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 23.20.315(b) (LEXIS 2000)).
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test.”728 The court affirmed the Department’s ruling that part B of
the test was not met because the lease-drivers dirt hauling was
729
within the usual course of business for Alaska Contracting. The
court also affirmed that part C of the test was not met, because
each lease-driver was not “customarily engaged in an independently established trade,” since Alaska Contracting provided many
730
of the lease-drivers with insurance on the trucks.
In Cassel v. Department of Administration,731 the supreme
court affirmed a superior court ruling that the termination of a
probationary employee was proper, because the termination conformed to the objective standards required by the collective bar732
gaining agreement. The court further affirmed the denial of back
pay, finding that the employee was not deprived of his due process
733
rights in the post-termination procedures. James Cassel was dismissed from his position as the Department of Public Safety’s Identification Bureau Chief after receiving an unacceptable performance rating from his supervisor during his twelve-month
734
probationary period. Applying the standard set forth in Univer735
sity of Alaska v. Tovsen, the court concluded that the collective
bargaining agreement permitted termination “only when a probationary employee has failed to satisfy objective standards of per736
formance.” The court then held that the Hearing Officer properly concluded that unsatisfactory performance of duties
constituted just cause for termination by applying an objective
737
standard, despite relying on the evaluation of Cassel’s supervisor.
Finally, the court held that the post-termination procedures did not
violate Cassel’s due process rights because they were fair, reasonable, efficacious, and in accordance with the collective bargaining
738
Thus, the court found that he was properly denied
agreement.
739
back pay.
In Cavin v. Department of Public Safety,740 the supreme court
reversed the superior court holding that Cavin was not a “seaman”
728.
729.
730.
731.
732.
733.
734.
735.
736.
737.
738.
739.
740.

See id. at 351.
See id. at 350.
Id.
14 P.3d 278 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 285.
See id. at 287.
See id. at 281.
835 P.2d 445 (Alaska 1992).
Cassel, 14 P.3d at 283-84.
See id. at 284-85.
See id. at 287.
See id.
3 P.3d 323 (Alaska 2000).
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under the Jones Act and remanded the case for further proceedings.741 Cavin, an employee of the Alaska Department of Public
Safety, Fish and Wildlife Protection Division, brought suit under
the Jones Act to recover federal maritime remedies for injuries he
742
suffered while working on state vessels. Cavin alleged “claims of
Jones Act negligence, general maritime negligence, unseaworthi743
ness, and maintenance and cure.” Because Cavin did not spend
at least thirty percent of his time working solely on boat duty, the
superior court found that he did not meet the temporal requirement for time spent working on vessels, and thus did not qualify as
744
a “seaman” under the Jones Act. The supreme court remanded
because the superior court failed to consider Cavin’s employment
745
between 1983-87. The supreme court also remanded for consideration of whether Cavin qualified as a “seasonal seaman” under
746
Finally, the supreme court noted that, if on rethe Jones Act.
mand the superior court could not find recovery under the Jones
Act, Cavin’s unseaworthiness claim should still proceed to trial,
747
unless barred by the statue of limitations.
In Sever v. NLRB and Alaska Pulp Corporation v. NLRB,748
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Alaska
Pulp Corporation had the right to reinstate strikers in any nondis749
criminatory order, including merit. Further, the court held that
Alaska Pulp must be given an opportunity to prove that the employees who voluntarily resigned for pension benefits had severed
the employment relationship unequivocally and were not due back
750
pay or reinstatement. Following an economic strike, the National
Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) found that Alaska Pulp had
committed various unfair labor practices because of the methods it
751
employed when rehiring the striking workers. Additionally, several of the strikers were not offered reinstatement because they accepted an offer by Alaska Pulp of a lump sum payment of pension
752
benefits in exchange for voluntary resignation. In the first mat-

741.
742.
743.
744.
745.
746.
747.
748.
749.
750.
751.
752.

See id. at 324.
See id. at 324-25.
Id. at 325.
See id. at 325-26.
See id. at 328.
See id. at 329-30.
See id. at 332.
231 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2000).
See id. at 1167.
See id. at 1169-70.
See id. at 1159-64.
See id. at 1161.
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ter, the court of appeals found that the NLRB had erred when it
forced Alaska Pulp to use seniority in determining the amount of
753
The court held that, under the
back pay it owed the workers.
754
controlling Lone Star case, an employer could recall workers using any nondiscriminatory method it wanted, thus permitting its
755
use of merit. The court also found that accepting pension bene756
fits did not express an employee’s intention to quit. Instead, the
court held that, on remand, the NLRB needed to consider whether
757
Alaska Pulp met its burden under the Augusta Bakery case test
“to prove that each employee who resigned expressed an unequivocal intent to sever his or her relationship with the com758
pany.”
In Wescott v. State,759 the supreme court held that the Department of Labor (the “Department”) failed to consider adequately
the risk an individual’s work posed to his health as a factor in determining whether he could receive “waiting week” unemployment
760
benefits. Wescott was a drilling roustabout at Alaska Petroleum
761
Although
Contractors when he had surgery on his club foot.
Wescott’s physician eventually gave him a full medical release, he
recommended Wescott get a job that did not require prolonged
762
standing and walking. Wescott later quit his job and applied for
unemployment benefits under the Alaska Employment Security
763
The Department’s Division of Employment Security inAct.
formed Wescott that he would not receive benefits for his first six
weeks of unemployment (waiting week benefits), because he vol764
The supreme
untarily left suitable work without good cause.
court held that the Department failed to consider the degree of risk
765
to Wescott’s health and safety that his work presented. The court
held that a job which a worker is physically capable of performing
766
may be unsuitable if it is detrimental to the worker’s health.
753. See id. at 1165.
754. 279 N.L.R.B. 550 (1986).
755. See Sever, 231 F.3d. at. 1167.
756. See id. at 1168.
757. 298 N.L.R.B. 58 (1990), enforced sub nom. N.L.R.B. v. Augusta Bakery,
Corp., 957 F.2d 1467 (7th Cir. 1992).
758. Sever, 231 F.3d at 1170.
759. 996 P.2d 723 (Alaska 2000).
760. See id. at 723-24.
761. See id. at 724.
762. See id.
763. See id. at 725.
764. See id.
765. See id. at 727.
766. See id. at 727-28.
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C. Workers’ Compensation
767
In Berger v. Wein Air Alaska, the supreme court reversed the
Workers’ Compensation Board’s decision not to allow amounts
payable by an employer to offset an employer’s portion of a third768
party tort award. The supreme court remanded for reconsidera769
Berger, a
tion the reduction amount of the employer’s credit.
flight attendant for Wein Air Alaska, suffered injuries from a plane
crash and settled a workers’ compensation claim against Wein Air,
770
In a
leaving Wein Air liable for any future medical expenses.
previous suit against the State of Alaska, Wein Air claimed a credit
771
from the recovery. When Berger eventually sought further benefits from Wein Air for additional medical expenses, Wein Air
claimed it still had credit from the tort suit that had not been offset
772
The supreme
by medical expenses paid by collateral sources.
court held that, although collateral sources paid the expenses, Wein
Air’s credit was still offset by the amount of the expenses, because
Alaska Statutes section 23.30.015(g) allows a reduction of credit by
773
If the collateral sources
all amounts payable by the employer.
had not paid the expenses, Wein Air would have been liable for
774
payment under Alaska Statutes section 23.30.015(g).
775
In Bloom v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., the supreme
court reversed the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board’s decision to deny Bloom’s request to change attending physicians with776
out the permission of his employer. Bloom injured his back while
777
working for his employer, Tekton, Inc. Bloom had two surgeries
778
Bloom visited another
but continued experiencing back pain.
779
He then redoctor, but was dissatisfied with the assessment.
quested permission from Tekton’s insurance adjuster to seek a sec780
ond opinion, but his request was denied. Bloom tried to schedule
another appointment with the original physician, but the doctor
767.
768.
769.
770.
771.
772.
773.
774.
775.
776.
777.
778.
779.
780.

995 P.2d 240 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 241.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 242.
See id.
5 P.3d 235 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 236.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 237.
See id.
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was unavailable to see Bloom.781 Tekton later permitted Bloom to
seek a second opinion, but refused to allow him to see the doctor of
782
his choice. The court held that, since the physician referred by
Tekton was either unavailable or unwilling to treat him, Bloom had
a right to name a new attending physician pursuant to Alaska Statutes section 23.30.095(a) without obtaining his employer’s permis783
sion.
In Carlson v. Doyon Universal-Ogden Services,784 the supreme
court held that the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board did not
err in finding that an employee was not entitled to Permanent Total Disability (“PTD”) benefits, because the employer adequately
showed that regular and continuous employment was available to
785
Carlson injured her back while working as a
the employee.
786
housekeeper for the appellees. Carlson became ineligible for the
Temporary Total Disability benefits she had been receiving, be787
cause her condition eventually stabilized. Therefore, she applied
788
for PTD benefits. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act presumes that the employee’s claim is compensable, so the employer
must rebut the presumption for PTD with substantial evidence to
789
the contrary. Although Carlson presented testimony supporting
790
her claim that she could not work, the court held that she did not
prove her claim by a preponderance of the evidence, and that the
employer presented substantial evidence that Carlson did not
791
Therefore, the court affirmed the Board’s decision to
qualify.
792
deny PTD benefits.
In DeYonge v. NANA/Marriott,793 the supreme court rejected a
distinction between aggravation of symptoms and aggravation of
the underlying impairment to reverse the denial of benefits to a
worker with a pre-existing arthritic condition exacerbated by her
794
job. Judy DeYonge’s job as a housekeeper for NANA/Marriott

781.
782.
783.
784.
785.
786.
787.
788.
789.
790.
791.
792.
793.
794.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 239.
995 P.2d 224 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 226.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 227.
See id. at 228.
See id. at 228-229.
See id. at 231.
1 P.3d 90 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 92.
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required that she kneel, bend, and stoop when cleaning.795 Pain in
DeYonge’s knees became so intense from this work that she left
796
her job. The Workers’ Compensation Board denied her claim on
the premise that job must worsen the underlying condition, not just
797
the symptoms, to be compensable. The supreme court held that
under Alaska law, once DeYonge showed “some evidence” that
the injury was related to her job, a presumption of compensability
798
applies. In order for NANA/Marriott to rebut this presumption,
it would have to provide substantial evidence of an alternative explanation that excluded work factors as the cause of the impairment or eliminate any reasonable possibility that the job caused the
799
disability. The court held that NANA/Marriott did not provide
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of compensability, and
800
the Board’s decision was reversed and remanded.
801
In Doyon Universal Services v. Allen, the supreme court affirmed the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board’s finding that an
employee’s injury arose in the scope of his employment and his
work-related injury was a substantial factor in causing his disabil802
ity. Lawrence Allen was employed by Doyon at a remote site on
803
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. On August 21, 1997, Allen ate a dinner that included Brussels sprouts at the company cafeteria, which
804
was the only eating establishment available at his workplace.
Later that evening, Allen suffered acute abdominal pain, accompa805
nied by vomiting and severe diarrhea. On August 23, 1997, Allen
was flown to the Alaska Native Medical Center, where it was determined that he had a bowel obstruction caused by two bezoars
806
containing traces of undigested Brussels sprouts. Allen filed an
injury report with Doyon on September 5, 1997, and Doyon responded by filing notice that it would not pay Allen benefits, since
his injuries did not arise in the course and scope of his employ807
Allen then filed an Application of Adjustment of Claim
ment.

795.
796.
797.
798.
799.
800.
801.
802.
803.
804.
805.
806.
807.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 93.
See id. at 95.
See id. at 96.
See id. at 98.
999 P.2d 764 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 771.
See id. at 766.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 767.
See id.
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with the Department of Labor.808 The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board held a hearing on May 12, 1998, and the Board determined that Allen’s intestinal obstruction was a compensable in809
jury. The supreme court agreed with the Board’s determination
that the Brussels sprouts were a substantial factor in causing Allen’s injury because Allen’s eating options were strictly limited to
810
Allen was entitled to
his employer’s facilities at a remote site.
compensation, because the disability would not have happened but
for an injury sustained in the course and scope of employment, and
because reasonable persons would regard the injury as the cause of
811
disability.
In Steffey v. Municipality of Anchorage,812 the supreme court
held that, where a defendant employer presents substantial evidence that work was not a substantial factor in causing the aggravation of an injury, and plaintiff fails to prove his claim by a preponderance of the evidence, the employer does not have to pay
workers’ compensation benefits under Alaska Statutes section
813
23.30.095. Instead, the supreme court applied Alaska Administrative Code title 8, section 45.082(f) to limit the payment require814
ment. In 1992, Robert Steffey suffered two work-related injuries,
and the Municipality of Anchorage paid for his chiropractic care
815
until April 1995. Steffey claimed that he should continue receiving care for eight work-related injuries that aggravated the original
816
The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board (the
injury.
“Board”) rejected his claim because it found that Steffey had not
817
sustained a compensable injury on any of the eight occasions. On
appeal, the superior court and the supreme court affirmed the
Board’s decision, holding that the Board had overcome a presumption that the injury was compensable by presenting evidence that
“either 1) provides an alternative explanation which, if accepted,
would exclude work related factors as a substantial cause of the
[aggravation or acceleration]; or 2) directly eliminates any reason-

808.
809.
810.
811.
812.
813.
814.
815.
816.
817.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 770.
See id.
1 P.3d 685 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 691-92.
See id. at 692.
See id. at 687.
See id. at 688.
See id. at 689.
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able possibility that employment was a factor in causing the [aggravation or acceleration].”818
D. Miscellaneous
In Egemo v. Egemo Construction Co.,819 the supreme court
held that the two-year statute of limitations to file a claim for timeloss benefits does not begin to run until the injured employee both
experiences actual disablement from the injury and knows of the
820
Bedisability’s full effect on the employee’s earning capacity.
cause Egemo’s doctor told him he would someday need surgery to
correct a leg deformity sustained in a work-related accident, the insurer claimed that Egemo knew of his impending disability more
821
than ten years before filing his claim. The supreme court rejected
the insurer’s arguments, holding that disablement occurred only
when Egemo sustained wage losses because of his inability to work
822
following corrective surgery. The court also decided that previous disablement from the same injury did not disqualify Egemo’s
823
claim.
VIII. FAMILY LAW
A. Child Support
824
In Atcherian v. Child Support Enforcement Division, the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s order that entitled Atcherian to a refund of child support collected after his motion to va825
Pursuant to a default judgment of
cate a paternity judgment.
paternity filed against Atcherian, the Child Support Enforcement
826
Division (“CSED”) ordered Atcherian to pay child support.
However, a paternity test disproved Atcherian’s paternity and the
827
superior court vacated the paternity judgment. The court did not
grant Atcherian full restitution, but required CSED to reimburse
him for any child support collected after the date he moved to va828
cate his paternity judgment. On appeal, the supreme court held
818.
819.
820.
821.
822.
823.
824.
825.
826.
827.
828.

Id. at 690-91.
998 P.2d 434 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 440.
See id. at 439.
See id.
See id. at 439-40.
14 P.3d 970 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 977.
See id. at 972.
See id. at 973.
See id.
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that, without any impropriety on the part of CSED in establishing
or collecting child support, a father whose paternity has been disproved cannot require the CSED to repay funds that it has already
829
disbursed for the benefit of the child. Because there was no misconduct on the part of CSED, the order of the superior court was
830
affirmed.
In Bennett v. Bennett,831 the supreme court held that, under
832
Turinsky v. Long, child support awards “should follow custody
833
When Rita and Albert Bennett divorced, Rita was
orders.”
834
granted primary custody. However, a motion to modify custody
835
was made when one of the children went to live with Albert. This
arrangement did not work, and the child then lived with Rita while
836
Albert had de jure custody. Rita then moved to modify the custody order again, and requested custody and child support for the
837
time the child lived with her while Albert had legal custody. The
court affirmed the decision of the superior court to deny Rita this
child support reimbursement because Turinsky requires child sup838
port to follow court-ordered custody rather than de facto custody.
However, the court found that the trial court abused its discretion
in retroactively awarding child support to Albert while the child
839
lived with Rita. Such an award was violative of the purpose of
840
child support payments, which is to benefit the child.
In Child Support Enforcement Division v. Button,841 the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision that the Child
Support Enforcement Division (“CSED”) could not collect child
support payments that were in arrears because Button adequately
rebutted the presumption of paternity at the first formal opportu842
nity. In 1986, Button acknowledged his paternity of Vickie Han843
However, he subsequently discovsen and paid child support.
ered that he was not Vickie’s biological father and discontinued the
829.
830.
831.
832.
833.
834.
835.
836.
837.
838.
839.
840.
841.
842.
843.

See id. at 975-76.
See id. at 976, 977.
6 P.3d 724 (Alaska 2000).
910 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1996).
Bennett, 6 P.3d at 725.
See id. at 725.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 725-26.
See id. at 727.
See id. at 728.
See id. at 727-28.
7 P.3d 74 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 75.
See id.
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support payments.844 In 1995, the CSED notified Button that he
was in arrears for $40,684 of public assistance that had been paid
845
The superior court disestablished Button’s
on Vickie’s behalf.
paternity after tests confirmed he was not the biological father,
which relieved him of any ongoing support obligations and the
846
amount in arrears. The court affirmed the superior court’s holding that the CSED had never issued a valid support order because
Button requested a formal hearing to contest the order within the
847
Because a valid support order
statutorily allotted time period.
was not issued before Button disestablished paternity, he did not
848
owe the amount in arrears.
In Child Support Enforcement Division v. Leitch,849 the supreme court held that the Child Support Enforcement Division
(“CSED”) had the authority to request modification of a child
support order against the obligee of the order when a change in
physical custody had occurred, but the order had not been
850
McKinnon and Leitch are the parents of a minor
changed.
851
child. After the court granted physical custody to Leitch and ordered McKinnon to pay child support, McKinnon took physical
custody of the minor at various times, receiving public assistance
852
for the child during those periods. The CSED moved to modify
the child support order to obtain payments from Leitch for the
public assistance received by McKinnon when the child was in his
853
custody. Alaska Statutes section 25.27.045 allows CSED to seek
modification of a support order “upon application of an obligee or
at the agency’s own discretion if the obligor is liable to the state
854
under Alaska Statutes section 25.27.120(a) or (b).” The court defined the term “obligor” as a person owing a duty of support that is
855
imposed or imposable by law or by court order. Although Leitch
was not the obligor under the child support order, she was an obli844. See id.
845. See id.
846. See id. at 75-76.
847. See id. at 76-77.
848. See id. at 77.
849. 999 P.2d 782 (Alaska 2000).
850. See id. at 784.
851. See id. at 782.
852. See id.
853. See id.
854. Id. at 783 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.045 (LEXIS 2000)). Alaska
Statutes section 25.27.120 allows CSED to seek reimbursement for public assistance received by a parent who is required to pay child support. See ALASKA
STAT. § 25.27.045 (LEXIS 2000).
855. See Leitch, 999 P.2d at 783.
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gor under Alaska Statutes section 25.27.045 because liability for
support could potentially be imposed on her.856 The court held that
given the broad power and authority granted to CSED, the legislature did not intend to prevent CSED from seeking modification of
child support orders where physical custody of the child has
857
changed but the actual order has not. Therefore, CSED had the
858
authority to initiate a modification proceeding against Leitch.
In Child Support Enforcement Division v. McCormick,859 the
supreme court held that a custodial parent’s motion to extend the
duration of child support beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday
does not require a showing of changed circumstances under Alaska
860
Larry
Statutes section 25.24.170(a) and its 1992 amendment.
McCormick and his ex-wife Colleen divorced in 1992, after a statutory amendment had been passed allowing a court to extend sup861
port to eighteen-year-old children upon a motion by either party.
Although the original child support order did not provide for postmajority support, the Child Support Enforcement Division moved
in 1999 to increase Larry’s support payments and also to extend the
862
duration of the payments past the children’s eighteenth birthdays.
The court held that if the original order did not expressly exclude
such support and the child meets the statute’s requirements of being unmarried, pursuing a high school diploma, and living dependently with a parent or guardian, then post-majority support of an
eighteen-year-old child will be extended in all but the most excep863
tional cases.
In Child Support Enforcement Division v. Pealatere,864 the supreme court held that the Child Support Enforcement Division
(“CSED”) was not entitled to reimbursement of public assistance
under Alaska Statutes section 25.27.120(a) because the child support offset agreement approved by the superior court served the
865
child’s best interests. In the Pealatere’s divorce decree, custody
of their minor son was granted to Ralph Pealatere, and Kathy
Pealatere’s child support obligations were waived in exchange for
her relinquishment of her marital property claims in her husband’s
856.
857.
858.
859.
860.
861.
862.
863.
864.
865.

See id.
See id. at 784.
See id.
3 P.3d 930 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 930-31.
See id. at 930 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.170 (LEXIS 2000)).
See id.
See id. at 931.
996 P.2d 84 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 85-86.
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tools.866 After the Pealatere’s son received aid from the state,
CSED sought reimbursement from Kathy Pealatere for the public
867
assistance. Although CSED v. Green held that CSED had an in868
dependent statutory right to recoup such costs, the supreme court
found an exception to this rule when CSED’s right to reimburse869
The court afment should yield to equitable considerations.
firmed the superior court’s decision to allow the defendant Kathy
Pealatere to offset her child support obligation by relinquishing her
interest in a portion of the marital property because the offset preserved the custodial parent’s means of support and was therefore in
870
the child’s best interests. However, the court reversed the valuation of the offset because the lower court did not account for Mr.
871
Pealatere’s share of the marital property.
In Child Support Recovery Services, Inc. v. Inn at the Water872
front, the supreme court affirmed summary judgment for the Inn
at the Waterfront, holding that the Inn did not owe the Child Support Recovery Services (“CSRS”) certain wages withheld from one
873
of its employees. The Inn at the Waterfront employed Cullinane,
a non-custodial parent who was delinquent on child support pay874
The Alaska Child Support Enforcement Division made
ments.
efforts to collect the payments, including three Orders to Withhold
[Income] and Deliver Property (“WID”) in accordance with
875
Alaska Statutes section 25.27.260. However, Cullinane later fully
paid the child support in full satisfaction of his outstanding obliga876
tions. The court found that the Inn’s liability for failure to comply with the WIDs was “joint and several with Cullinane’s [liabil877
ity].” Therefore, the Inn did not owe CSRS any money since its
878
obligation ended with Cullinane’s.
879
In Schuyler v. Briner, the supreme court held that an increase in a father’s child support payments without a hearing was
improper where the father alleged that his rise in income was solely
866.
867.
868.
869.
870.
871.
872.
873.
874.
875.
876.
877.
878.
879.

See id. at 85.
See id.
983 P.2d 1249 (Alaska 1999).
See Pealatere, 996 P.2d at 87.
See id.
See id.
7 P.3d 63 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 64.
See id.
See id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.260 (LEXIS 2000).
See id. at 65.
Id. at 73.
See id.
13 P.3d 738 (Alaska 2000).
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attributable to overtime worked in an effort to provide for his new
family.880 Pursuant to a divorce agreement, Bill Schuyler had been
paying child support to his former wife Florence Briner for their
881
In September 1999, the Child Support Endaughter, Valerie.
forcement Division (“CSED”) moved for an increase in Bill’s child
882
support payments based on its review of his income information.
The supreme court held that the superior court should have considered Bill’s efforts to provide for his new family as a defense to
the upward modification, because the commentary to Alaska Civil
Rule 90.3 provides that “the interests of the subsequent family may
be taken into account as a defense to a modification action where
an obligor proves he or she has . . . increased his or her income spe883
cifically to better provide for a subsequent family.”
The court next held that the lower court did not err in denying
a hearing for modified custody where the father failed to demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child’s
884
welfare. The supreme court reasoned that Bill failed to establish
885
that a change in custody would be in Valerie’s best interests. The
court reasoned that Valerie’s new living arrangement with her
brother did not necessitate a custody modification in order to serve
her best interests, because both Florence and Bill had agreed that
886
Valerie should live with her brother.
B. Child Custody
887
In A.B. v. Department of Health and Social Services, the supreme court remanded a parental rights case for determinations
regarding whether parental rights were terminated in accordance
888
Under Alaska Statutes section
with the relevant statute.
47.10.088(a), parental rights may be terminated “for purposes of
889
freeing a child for adoption or other permanent placement.” The
court must find the child to be “in need of aid” under Alaska Statutes section 47.10.011 and that the parent “has not remedied the
890
The court
conduct or conditions that place the child at risk.”
880.
881.
882.
883.
884.
885.
886.
887.
888.
889.
890.

See id. at 745.
See id. at 740.
See id.
Id. at 743 (citing Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3, commentary VI.B.2).
See id. at 745.
See id. at 742.
See id.
7 P.3d 946 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 953-54.
Id. at 950.
Id.
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must also consider the best interests of the child and must find that
the Division of Family and Youth Services (“DFYS”) “has made
reasonable efforts to support the family and foster the safe return
891
of the child to the family home.” The court found that because
DFYS was attempting to reunite the child with her biological father at the time of the proceedings, it was not clear that the
mother’s parental rights were terminated for purposes of adoption
892
or permanent placement. In addition, the court found that if efforts to reunite the child with her father were successful, terminating the mother’s parental rights may not be in the child’s best in893
terests.
In A.H. v. Department of Health and Social Services,894 the su895
preme court affirmed the termination of A.H.’s parental rights.
The superior court did not err in finding that A.H.’s children were
Children In Need of Aid (“CINA”) “due to neglect, domestic violence, and mental illness,” any one of which would be sufficient on
896
its own to render them CINA. The record also supported the superior court’s determination that A.H. had not corrected the condi897
tions that put his children at risk. Further, the court did not err in
finding that the state made active, reasonable efforts to promote
898
the children’s safe return to their parents. As required by the Indian Child Welfare Act, the state also proved likely “serious emotional and physical damage” would result from continued custody
899
by A.H.
In Allen v. Child Support Enforcement Division,900 the supreme
court held that the superior court erred in dismissing Allen’s appeal of the Child Support Enforcement Division’s (“CSED”) deci901
sion not to modify his child support order as untimely. Allen petitioned CSED to seek a court order reducing his child support
obligations and also requested review of a CSED decision regard902
ing his unpaid child support. After CSED denied review of both
of his claims, he appealed to the superior court, which dismissed his

891.
892.
893.
894.
895.
896.
897.
898.
899.
900.
901.
902.

Id.
See id. at 954.
See id. at 954-55.
10 P.3d 1156 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 1158.
Id. at 1161.
See id. at 1163.
See id. at 1165.
Id.
15 P.3d 743 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 745.
See id.
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appeal as untimely.903 However, because CSED did not notify Allen that its decisions were final, the thirty-day appeal period did
not begin to run, and therefore, the court held that Allen’s appeals
904
were not untimely. As a result, the court reversed and remanded
905
the dismissal of Allen’s appeal. Because another court was considering Allen’s appeal of the CSED decision regarding his unpaid
child support, the court held that dismissal of that appeal as un906
timely was harmless error.
In D.M. v. Division of Family and Youth Services,907 the supreme court held that Children In Need of Aid (“CINA”) rules
governing adjudication and termination processes did not preclude
the State from using the clear and convincing standard of evidence
908
at an adjudication hearing. CINA rules required different standards of proof for adjudication and termination stages, with the
termination stage requiring the clear and convincing standard, as
opposed to the usual preponderance of the evidence standard used
909
for the adjudication stage. The State filed a petition to adjudicate
D.M.’s children as CINA, and once a hearing was held on the petition, the State asked that the clear and convincing standard be used
910
in the adjudication proceeding. The State had not given notice to
911
D.M. that it sought to use the stricter evidentiary standard. After
a finding that the children were CINA, the State sought to termi912
nate D.M.’s parental rights for four of her five children. In terminating those rights, the superior court relied on the clear and
913
convincing standard findings of the adjudication proceeding. The
supreme court affirmed this finding and noted that D.M. was not
foreclosed from litigating issues relevant to the termination of her
914
rights at the termination proceeding.
In In re Dissolution of the Marriage of Alaback,915 the supreme
court affirmed the superior court’s denial of a motion to unseal records regarding a child custody proceeding where the movant had
not shown that her interest in disclosure outweighed the potential
903.
904.
905.
906.
907.
908.
909.
910.
911.
912.
913.
914.
915.

See id. at 745-46.
See id. at 748.
See id. at 749.
See id. at 748-49.
995 P.2d 205 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 209.
See id. at 208.
See id. at 207.
See id.
See id. at 207-08.
See id. at 207.
See id. at 209.
997 P.2d 1181 (Alaska 2000).
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harm to the child.916 The dispute giving rise to the motion centered
on a tape made by a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) of a session with a
917
child who was the subject of a custody proceeding. The GAL had
turned the tape over to the opposing attorney after the attorney
stipulated that she would not reveal its contents to her client, the
918
child’s mother. When the attorney violated this stipulation, the
919
Four
superior court ordered the contents of the tape sealed.
years later, the attorney sought to unseal the material for use in
other cases involving the GAL, but the superior court denied her
motion because it could not determine the potential significance of
the records outside the context of the proposed litigation and the
attorney had not demonstrated that unsealing the files would have
920
no adverse impact on the child. The supreme court held that, because the attorney’s motion did not challenge the original order,
the superior court acted within its discretion in denying the mo921
tion.
In Jenkins v. Handel,922 the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s denial of Jenkins’s motion to modify a custody agreement, finding that the superior court had adequately weighed fac923
tors relevant to the best interests of the children. Jenkins argued
that her improved living conditions, the children’s desire to live
with her, and Handel’s failure to comply with visitation agreements
924
all supported her claim to modify custody. Alaska Statutes section 25.20.110(a) requires a court to consider the best interests of a
child and requires that the non-custodial parent establish a change
925
in circumstances. In considering the best interests of the children,
the superior court found that Handel had shown “mature parental
judgment” in his monitoring of the children and that this judgment
926
Because
outweighed the children’s desire to live with Jenkins.
the supreme court agreed that the children’s preferences were not
“mature and well reasoned” and that the children needed a highly
927
monitored environment, it upheld the superior court’s ruling.

916.
917.
918.
919.
920.
921.
922.
923.
924.
925.
926.
927.

See id. at 1186.
See id. at 1182.
See id. at 1183.
See id. at 1183-84.
See id. at 1184, 1186.
See id. at 1186.
10 P.3d 586 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 588.
See id. at 589.
See id.
Id. at 590.
Id. at 590-91.
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Additionally, the supreme court found that the superior court had
given adequate consideration to Jenkins’ changed circumstances
and that the superior court was not in error when it failed to con928
sider Handel’s failure to comply with visitation agreements.
In Lauth v. Alaska Department of Health and Social Services,929
the supreme court upheld the superior court’s denial of Lauth’s
claim for welfare benefits based on its interpretation of “physical
930
custody.” The Alaska Temporary Assistance Program provides
welfare to the families of needy children when one parent or both
931
parents apply. To qualify for the benefits, a parent must establish
932
“physical custody of one or more . . . dependent children.” Lauth
applied for benefits under this program, claiming that she had
physical custody of her children even though she shared custody
933
The Temporary Assistance Agency applied
with John Hasty.
Alaska Administrative Code title 7, section 45.225(b) and denied
her claim because she actually had custody of the children for
934
fewer hours during each month than Hasty. Lauth then appealed
to the director of the agency, claiming that the agency should have
applied Alaska Administrative Code title 7, section 45.225(d) to
determine physical custody by weighing a number of different fac935
tors instead of simply adding up the hours. The director denied
Lauth’s appeal, claiming that the factor test only applied when both
parents claimed benefits and the hourly count applied when one
936
The superior court upheld this denial,
parent claimed benefits.
finding that the distinction made by the agency between the two
ways of determining physical custody was a reasonable distinction
937
Further, the distinction
consistent with the statute’s purpose.
posed no equal protection problems because “children with one
economically secure parent who is providing for their care at least
fifty percent of the time are not similarly situated with children
938
having both parents economically eligible for benefits.”

928.
929.
930.
931.
932.
933.
934.
935.
936.
937.
938.

See id. at 591-92.
12 P.3d 181 (Alaska 2000).
Id. at 182.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 183.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 185.
Id. at 187.
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In L.G. v. Alaska, Department of Health and Social Services,939
the supreme court held that the trial court did not err in terminating a native’s parental rights following a long history of abandonment and substance abuse, or in deviating from the Indian Child
Welfare Act’s preferences by placing one of the children with a
940
non-native foster parent. Linda had a long history of substance
941
abuse, imprisonment, and parole violations. Throughout Linda’s
troubles, two of her children, J.G. and S.G., had been placed in and
942
out of the custody of numerous adults. Following a court order
terminating Linda’s parental rights and placing her children in fos943
ter homes, Linda appealed. By statute, termination of parental
rights of an Indian child requires a determination “‘that continued
custody of the child by the parent . . . is likely to result in serious
944
emotional or physical damage to the child.’” The supreme court
clarified that this determination requires “both proof that the parent’s conduct is likely to harm the children, and proof that it is un945
likely that the parent will change her conduct.” Because qualified experts testified that Linda’s repeated drug abuses and
repeated separations from her children caused her children serious
mental injury, the court found that “both girls were at a substantial
risk of suffering further mental injury if returned to her care,” and
946
Furthat Linda’s parental misconduct was likely to continue.
thermore, the court reasoned that where there is “clear evidence
that a child faces a serious risk of physical neglect if she remains in
her parent’s care, a trial judge may terminate parental rights with947
Acout hearing testimony from an expert in Native cultures.”
cordingly, given the record in this case, the supreme court found
that the termination of Linda’s parental rights did not require tes948
timony from an expert in Native culture.
949
In Pearson v. Pearson, the supreme court held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying a father’s request
for a child custody investigation or in finding continued custody by

939.
940.
941.
942.
943.
944.
945.
946.
947.
948.
949.

14 P.3d 946 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 955-56.
See id. at 947-49.
See id.
See id. at 949.
Id. at 950 (quoting 25 U.S.C. §1912(f) (1994)).
Id. at 950.
Id. at 951.
Id. at 952-53.
See id. at 954.
5 P.3d 239 (Alaska 2000).
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the mother to be in the children’s best interests.950 Sara Pearson
was awarded custody of the children after a divorce from her hus951
After Sara moved to Pennsylvania, Mark sought
band, Mark.
952
changes to the custody arrangement. While the trial court did not
change the custody arrangement, it did alter the visitation sched953
ule. First, the supreme court noted that it is within the trial court
judge’s discretion to decide whether a child custody investigator
should be appointed and that Mark “failed to explain how that dis954
Second, the supreme court affirmed the
cretion was abused.”
trial court’s findings that continuing custody with the mother was in
the children’s best interest because Sara was not trying to alienate
955
Mark and the children had an interest in a stable environment.
Finally, the court found that Mark’s claim of gender bias did not
956
warrant reversal of the trial court.
957
In P.G. v. Division of Family and Youth Services, the supreme court held that the Division of Family and Youth Services
(“DFYS”) breached its duty to a foster family by failing to disclose
958
their foster child’s past disciplinary and psychological problems.
The court overturned a summary judgment ruling in favor of the
DFYS, because there was a genuine factual dispute on the issue of
whether the child’s physical and sexual assaults on his foster sister
and brother were foreseeable consequences of the DFYS’s failure
959
to disclose the child’s past history. In response to the State’s argument that nondisclosure was immaterial because the assaults on
the family’s children were not foreseeable, the court stressed that
foreseeability requires only that the injuries are “of the general na960
Finally, the court held that the
ture that could be expected.”
plaintiff’s claim against the DFYS did not “arise from an invasion
of financial or commercial interests,” and, therefore, did not qualify as a “misrepresentation” claim against the State barred by
961
Alaska Statutes section 09.50.250(3). Accordingly, the court re-

950.
951.
952.
953.
954.
955.
956.
957.
958.
959.
960.
961.

See id. at 242.
See id. at 240.
See id.
See id. at 242.
Id.
See id. at 243.
See id. at 244.
4 P.3d 326 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 328.
See id. at 335.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 336.
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versed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment based on
this provision.962
In R.I. v. C.C.,963 the supreme court held that the superior
court did not abuse its discretion in giving a mother sole custody
964
and denying the father’s request for a paternity test. Constance
and Richard had custody of their daughter, Cindy, at varying
965
times. On August 5, 1996, Constance applied for sole custody of
Cindy and asked for permission to apply for Cindy’s permanent
966
fund dividend. In determining that Constance should be awarded
sole custody, the superior court made findings of fact in addition to
considering the guardian ad litem’s recommendation that Con967
stance be awarded custody. The supreme court’s review of the
findings of fact found that none were clearly erroneous and that the
968
Fursuperior court’s ruling was not “prejudicial” to Richard.
thermore, the superior court was correct in denying Richard’s request for a paternity test because neither Richard nor Constance
969
had contested the paternity.
970
In R.M. v. S.G., the supreme court upheld the trial court’s
modification of child custody because the trial court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous and its legal conclusions were
971
Scott Greenville sought full custody of his
properly reached.
children following allegations of physical abuse by Rose Marlowe’s
972
Based on evidence provided by testinew husband, Michael.
mony of the children and the custody investigator, Dr. Glass, the
trial court found that a substantial change in circumstances warranted the change in custody to Scott with supervised visitation by
973
Rose. The supreme court found that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in refusing to compel Dr. Glass to disclose Scott’s
974
The court found that Rose failed to seek
psychological report.
reasonable relief and that conflicting expert interpretations of the
raw psychological data would not have been likely to alter the out-

962.
963.
964.
965.
966.
967.
968.
969.
970.
971.
972.
973.
974.

See id.
9 P.3d 274 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 277-79.
See id. at 275.
See id. at 276.
See id. at 277-78.
See id. at 278.
See id. at 279.
13 P.3d 747 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 747.
See id. at 749.
See id. at 750.
See id. at 751.
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come.975 The court also found no error in requiring Rose to pay
$1200 to depose Dr. Glass, because Rose did not argue or demonstrate that the $1200 fee constituted “manifest injustice” under
976
Alaska Civil Rule 26(b)(4)(C). Furthermore, the supreme court
found that since Rose did not properly raise her objections to the
admission of hearsay from Dr. Glass’ report at trial, she had waived
977
them on appeal. Finally, Rose’s objections to the modification of
custody were denied because there was no clear error in the trial
court’s determination that circumstances had changed and that the
978
modification was in the best interest of the children.
In S.S.M. v. Division of Family and Youth Services,979 the supreme court vacated the trial court’s order dismissing S.S.M.’s motion to gain custody of her brother pursuant to Alaska Statutes sec980
tion 47.14.100(e) and remanded to the trial court. S.S.M. is the
natural sister of J.M., a child placed in the State’s custody “for
adoptive purposes” in 1996 and who was living with a foster family
981
In July 1999, S.S.M. filed a pro se Motion to
as of June 1999.
982
Alaska Statutes section 47.14.100(e)
Place Child with Relative.
provides that, except under certain exceptional circumstances, a
child in need of aid should be placed in the home of a relative at
983
However, Alaska Statutes section
that relative’s request.
47.14.100(f) renders this preference for placement with a relative
984
The
inapplicable to “child placement for adoptive purposes.”
court held that the statutory meaning of “for adoptive purposes”
requires “a specific nexus between the existing placement and the
ultimate purpose of adoption,” not merely the hope of eventually
985
Thus, S.S.M. is not disqualified from
finding adoptive parents.
986
seeking preferential placement.
987
In Valentino v. Cote, the supreme court affirmed the trial
court’s grant of a father’s motion to transfer legal and physical cus988
tody of his fourteen-year-old son from his former wife to him.
975.
976.
977.
978.
979.
980.
981.
982.
983.
984.
985.
986.
987.
988.

See id.
See id. at 752.
See id.
See id. at 752-53.
3 P.3d 342 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 348.
Id. at 344.
See id.
See id. at 345-46.
Id. at 346.
Id. at 347.
See id. at 347-48.
3 P.3d 337 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 338.
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After the child’s relationship with his mother deteriorated, the
child moved into his father’s home and refused to live with his
989
mother. Custody modification is valid if the father shows that a
significant change in the child’s circumstances has occurred and
990
The
that a modification would be in the child’s best interests.
court held that the present circumstances qualified as significant
991
The court also held that the child’s preferences had
changes.
been properly considered because the child was of sufficient age
992
and capacity to form a preference.
C. Dissolution of Marriage and Distribution of Marital Property
In Coffland v. Coffland,993 the supreme court affirmed the trial
court’s sanction of appellant, Ken Coffland, under Alaska Civil
Rule 37 for failure to comply with court-ordered discovery, but re994
manded for reevaluation of the allocation of the marital property.
Because Mr. Coffland had refused repeated requests, including a
court order, to produce documents related to the business he and
his wife, Susan Coffland, had owned, Mr. Coffland was permitted
to present at trial only his own testimony and documentation that
995
The court imhad previously been disclosed to Mrs. Coffland.
posed this sanction to “[strike] an appropriate balance between
sanctioning recalcitrant discovery behavior and allowing [Mr. Cof996
The trial court refland] the opportunity to present his case.”
fused to allow Mr. Coffland to testify about two promissory notes
signed by Mrs. Coffland, because they did not substantiate his testimony; as a result, these debts were characterized as non997
marital. The supreme court affirmed the sanctions but held that
it was error to conclude that these debts did not exist as marital
property, when Mrs. Coffland admitted their existence and signed
998
the notes herself.
In Edelman v. Edelman,999 the supreme court reversed in part
the superior court’s division of the marital property debts between
plaintiff, Tammi Edelman, and her former husband, Duane Edel989.
990.
991.
992.
993.
994.
995.
996.
997.
998.
999.

See id.
See id. at 340.
See id.
See id.
4 P.3d 317 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 322.
See id. at 319-320.
Id. at 321.
See id. at 319-20.
See id. at 321-22.
3 P.3d 348 (Alaska 2000).
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man, and upheld the decision to vacate all alimony arrearages that
Duane owed her.1000 The court upheld the superior court’s determination that a fishing permit was a premarital asset of Duane not
subject to distribution because Tammi did not take an active inter1001
The
est in its ongoing maintenance, management, and control.
supreme court then held that the award of the marital residence to
Tammi was erroneous because it was based on the mistaken assumption that the property had been subdivided, and because the
appraisal could not be challenged after both parties had previously
1002
The court remanded the issue of
agreed on a property value.
whether Tammi’s claimed post-separation mortgage payments
from non-marital income should be credited against the residence’s
1003
The court held that any compensatory damages eventuvalue.
ally awarded to Duane for lost income arising out of the Exxon
Valdez disaster would be marital property, while any damages
awarded for devaluation of the fishing permit would remain
1004
Finally, the court found that the suDuane’s separate property.
perior court’s allocation of Duane’s entire pension fund to him was
erroneous as a matter of law because retirement benefits earned
during the marriage are marital assets subject to equitable divi1005
The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision
sion.
to vacate alimony arrearages that Duane owed, because Tammi
had remarried and had sufficient time to recover her financial sta1006
bility.
In Glasen v. Glasen,1007 the supreme court held that the superior court did not err when it denied the incorporation of a separation agreement into a later divorce, because the separation agreement was not a final order and because it terminated upon a
1008
Danny and Gail Glasen married in
subsequent reconciliation.
1009
In July 1991, the Glasens were separated legally, but they
1987.
1010
Upon filremained married and reconciled a few months later.
ing for divorce in 1997, Danny sought to enforce the 1991 separa-

1000.
1001.
1002.
1003.
1004.
1005.
1006.
1007.
1008.
1009.
1010.

See id. at 350.
See id. at 351-52.
See id. at 353.
See id. at 354.
See id. at 354-55.
See id. at 355-56.
See id. at 358.
13 P.3d 719 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 722-23.
See id. at 720-21.
See id. at 721.
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tion agreement.1011 The supreme court held that the Glasen’s de1012
cree of separation was not a final order for two primary reasons.
First, the court found that the decree was meant to be “provisional
and conditional,” because Danny’s testimony indicated that the
1013
Second, the
separation was not a permanent arrangement.
agreement could not embody a final property distribution because
it did not list or describe all the spouses’ assets, and because the
Glasens continued their marriage relationship for six years after
1014
the initial settlement agreement. The supreme court further held
that a legal separation decree terminates “if the parties become
1015
Since the “Glasens’ recreconciled and resume cohabitation.”
onciliation, cohabitation, and economic commingling [after the
separation] indicated an intent to behave as a marital unit,” their
separation agreement was effectively rescinded and was properly
1016
withheld from the divorce decree.
1017
In McDougall v. Lumpkin, the supreme court vacated and
remanded the property division and alimony award in the parties’
1018
divorce decree, but affirmed the award of joint legal custody.
The divorce decree divided the couple’s marital net worth, giving
Lumpkin assets worth approximately $35,600 and McDougall a net
value of negative $14,200, including responsibility for the student
1019
In addition, the oral
loans she incurred during the marriage.
findings of the divorce proceeding provided for alimony for
McDougall of $500 a month for four years, given the division of the
1020
However, the written findings did not specify the duproperty.
ration of the alimony and the court subsequently issued an adden1021
dum stating that the alimony would be payable for two years.
Lastly, the divorce decree gave the parties joint custody of their
1022
Because the division of property was “grossly infour children.
equitable,” and it appeared that the alimony award had not been
treated independently, the court vacated and remanded for an eq1023
In addition, the court held that the lower court
uitable division.
1011.
1012.
1013.
1014.
1015.
1016.
1017.
1018.
1019.
1020.
1021.
1022.
1023.

See id. at 722.
See id. at 722-23.
See id.
See id. at 723.
Id. (quoting 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce & Separation § 409 (1998)).
Id. at 724.
11 P.3d 990 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 991-92.
See id. at 993-94.
See id. at 995.
See id.
See id. at 995-96.
See id. at 993.
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abused its discretion when it treated McDougall’s student loans as
non-marital debt and allocated the entire amount to her.1024 On
remand, the court ordered the loans be treated as marital debt and
1025
ordered that the duration of the alimony payment be clarified.
Finally, because the record did not show that the court abused its
discretion in granting the parties’ joint custody, the court affirmed
1026
the award.
In Sampson v. Sampson,1027 the supreme court held that the
trial court abused its discretion by including inheritance in marital
1028
property subject to a divorce. After inheriting securities from his
deceased mother in 1990, William Sampson placed the securities in
1029
In 1994, Susan Sampson
an account bearing only his name.
cashed in her retirement account from her employment as a police
officer partly because “she knew that William’s inheritance would
1030
The supreme court found it
be available for their future needs.”
was error to include the inheritance as marital property in the divorce proceedings, because William’s promise that the inheritance
would be available to him and Susan during the marriage was “not
sufficient to overcome the strong presumption that inheritance is
1031
Furthermore, the court reasoned that the
separate property.”
inheritance was not marital property, because Susan alone made
the decision to cash in the retirement fund, not in reliance on any
1032
promises by William. Finally, the court remanded the case to determine whether and to what extent invasion of William’s separate
1033
property was required.
IX. INSURANCE LAW
1034
In Moore v. Allstate Insurance Co., the supreme court held
that federal courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over fraud
and misrepresentation claims against write-your-own (“WYO”) in1035
Moore acsurers under the National Flood Insurance Program.
quired flood insurance from an Allstate agent under the WYO
1024.
1025.
1026.
1027.
1028.
1029.
1030.
1031.
1032.
1033.
1034.
1035.

See id. at 994.
See id.
See id. at 996-97.
14 P.3d 272 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 277.
See id. at 274.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 276.
See id. at 277.
See id.
995 P.2d 231 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 239.
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program, in which private insurance companies sell Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) flood insurance policies.1036
When her house was condemned, FEMA awarded her forty per1037
Disappointed with the
cent of the house’s fair market value.
payment, Moore filed suit in state court against Allstate and its
agent, making various claims, including fraud and misrepresenta1038
Because the superior court held that federal courts had extion.
clusive jurisdiction over such claims, Moore’s claims were dis1039
The supreme court
missed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
reversed, holding that while federal courts do have exclusive jurisdiction over direct claims under the policy, they do not have exclu1040
sive jurisdiction over claims of fraud and misrepresentation.
1041
In Bennett v. Hedglin, the supreme court held that the lower
court properly granted summary judgment to an insurer that de1042
The innied coverage for the loss of a cabin destroyed in a fire.
surer denied coverage on the grounds that the appellant policyholder made numerous misrepresentations on his application,
including a false statement that the cabin was his primary resi1043
The court concluded that this misrepresentation was madence.
terial to the insurer’s acceptance of the risk of insuring the cabin,
and that consequently, Alaska Statutes section 21.42.110 permitted
1044
The court further concluded that it
the insurer to deny coverage.
was not necessary for the insurer to have cancelled the policy prior
to the fire, because the policyholder’s misrepresentation rendered
1045
Although the court deterthe insurance policy void ab initio.
mined that the appellant improperly had been denied an oral argument, it held that the denial was harmless error because the ap1046
pellant failed to demonstrate that it prejudiced him.
1047
In C.P. v. All-State Insurance Co., the supreme court held
that salaried insurance adjusters owe a tort duty of reasonable care
to the insured, and that the policy in question covered claims involving the insured’s alleged negligent failure to protect a visiting

1036.
1037.
1038.
1039.
1040.
1041.
1042.
1043.
1044.
1045.
1046.
1047.

See id. at 232, 234.
See id. at 233.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 238-39.
995 P.2d 668 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 674.
See id. at 671.
See id. at 672.
See id. at 674.
See id.
996 P.2d 1216 (Alaska 2000).
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child.1048 The plaintiff was a child who was assaulted while visiting
1049
The
the home of the insured, the Lancasters, by their adult son.
Lancasters reached a settlement with the plaintiff and her family
1050
and assigned to them their rights against All-State Insurance.
The supreme court held that a salaried adjuster employed by the
insurer owes a duty of care to the insured in addition to any con1051
The court “construe[d] grants of coverage broadly
tractual duty.
1052
and interpret[ed] exclusions narrowly,” finding that the insurance policy covered the claim that the homeowners were negligent
1053
in failing to protect the visiting child.
In Kim v. National Indemnity Co.,1054 the supreme court held
that Kim’s automobile insurance did not cover the injuries caused
1055
Kim was conby Kim’s sexual abuse of a minor in his taxicab.
victed of second- and third-degree sexual abuse of a minor and assigned his indemnity rights against his insurance company to the
1056
Kim’s
mother of the minor child in the corresponding civil suit.
automobile insurance policy covered damages that were caused by
1057
However, because Kim was convicted of knowingly
an accident.
engaging in sexual contact, the child’s injuries were not acciden1058
Furthermore, the court inferred intent to cause injury as a
tal.
matter of law, and therefore, there was no coverage under the pol1059
In addition, the
icy because the sexual abuse was not accidental.
court held that the abuse or molestation exclusion in the policy did
not provide coverage for injuries caused by Kim even if the minor
1060
was not in the care, custody, or control of the insured.
In Lloyd’s & Institute of London Underwriting Cos. v. Ful1061
ton, the supreme court held that an insurer must inform an insured of potential coverage issues, and that breach of this duty to
inform estops the insurer from denying coverage if the breach
1062
Fulton was injured while
caused actual harm to the insured.
1048.
1049.
1050.
1051.
1052.
1053.
1054.
1055.
1056.
1057.
1058.
1059.
1060.
1061.
1062.

See id.
See id. at 1218.
See id.
See id. at 1221-22.
Id. at 1223.
See id. at 1229.
6 P.3d 264 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 266.
See id.
See id. at 267.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 269.
2 P.3d 1199 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 1206, 1210.
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working aboard a fishing vessel owned by Clark.1063 Clark was insured under an indemnity policy provided by Pacific Marine Insurance Company (“PacMar”) and Lloyd’s & Institute of London Un1064
The vessel’s coverage under
derwriting Companies (“Lloyd’s”).
1065
Upon notithe policy was limited to specific geographical areas.
fication of Fulton’s injury, PacMar immediately recognized poten1066
tial problems with coverage and began to investigate the claim.
As a result, an investigator questioned Clark and his son without
their attorney present and obtained information that the vessel had
been outside the policy’s geographical limits when Fulton was in1067
After the investigation, PacMar notified Clark of its injured.
1068
Clark settled with
tent to reserve the right to dispute coverage.
Fulton and assigned Fulton his right to proceed against the insur1069
In the meantime, PacMar became insolvent and the court
ers.
held that PacMar’s actions bound Lloyd’s, noting that there should
1070
be only one defense because there was only one policy.
The court held that PacMar had enough information about its
potential coverage defenses to give Clark notice and that it
breached its duty of loyalty by failing to give notice before investi1071
The court further held that, by ingating the coverage problem.
terviewing the Clarks without their counsel or informing them of
their rights, PacMar prejudiced the Clarks. As such, PacMar was
estopped from denying coverage even though the claim would have
been denied because the injury occurred outside the policy’s geo1072
graphical limits.
In Makarka v. Great American Insurance Co.,1073 the supreme
court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Great American Insurance Company (“Great Ameri1074
Members of the Makarka family were killed when their
can”).
1075
The Makarkas learned
car was hit by a truck driven by Voliva.
that the breaks on Voliva’s truck were improperly serviced by

1063.
1064.
1065.
1066.
1067.
1068.
1069.
1070.
1071.
1072.
1073.
1074.
1075.

See id. at 1201.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1206.
See id. at 1209.
14 P.3d 964 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 970.
See id. at 965.
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Calihan prior to the accident.1076 Calihan’s employer was insured by
Great American when the brakes were worked on and by Inter1077
The court
state Fire and Casualty when the accident occurred.
held that the insurance policy provided by Great American was an
“occurrence policy” that only covered bodily injury that occurred
1078
Because the accident and resulting
during the dates of coverage.
bodily injury occurred outside Great American’s coverage, Great
1079
The court also reAmerican did not have a duty to indemnify.
jected the Makarkas’ claim that Calihan caused property damage
by improperly servicing Voliva’s breaks during the dates of coverage because the damage was done to the breaks, not to the Ma1080
Consequently, the court affirmed the grant of summary
karkas.
1081
judgment in favor of Great American.
In M.C. v. Northern Insurance Co. of New York,1082 the supreme court affirmed summary judgment for the defendant,
Northern Insurance, against the claims of a fifteen-year-old girl and
1083
The appellant was employed by the Anchorage
her mother.
Daily News to deliver papers. During the course of her employment, she engaged in sexual relations with her supervisor, Steven
1084
The appellant sued the AnFlory, a thirty-four-year-old man.
chorage Daily News’s insurer, Northern Insurance, since the rela1085
The
tions in question occurred while Flory was employed there.
court held that Steven Flory was not covered by the insurance because the policy explicitly excludes “bodily injury to a co1086
employee.”
In Nichols v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,1087 the supreme
court affirmed summary judgment to an insurer sued on theories of
negligent and intentional spoliation of evidence, which the court
1088
The suit stemmed from
refused to recognize under Alaska law.
an incident in which Nichols was injured when a ladder collapsed
beneath him while he was repairing a neighbor’s roof; Nichols filed
a claim with the neighbor’s insurer, State Farm, for payment of
1076.
1077.
1078.
1079.
1080.
1081.
1082.
1083.
1084.
1085.
1086.
1087.
1088.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 967.
See id.
See id. at 967-68.
See id. at 970.
1 P.3d 673 (Alaska 2000).
See id.
See id. at 674.
See id.
Id. at 675.
6 P.3d 300 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 304-05.
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medical expenses.1089 State Farm investigated the claim but could
not locate the ladder, allegedly because it was destroyed in a fire at
1090
the neighbor’s home that occurred before Nichols filed his claim.
When State Farm determined that the neighbor was not negligent
and refused to pay Nichols’s medical expenses, Nichols sued the
neighbor and State Farm, alleging that State Farm had negligently,
1091
The
recklessly, or intentionally failed to locate critical evidence.
supreme court held that there was no evidence that State Farm
acted recklessly or intentionally, and that because Alaska has not
recognized an independent tort for negligent spoliation of evi1092
dence, Nichols’s suit against State Farm could not be maintained.
1093
In Powers v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, the supreme
court held that an injured plaintiff who successfully arbitrated an
uninsured motorist claim against a primary insurance carrier cannot preclude a secondary carrier from further arbitration where the
secondary carrier had neither adequate notice of the first arbitra1094
The plaintiff, Karl
tion nor an opportunity to participate in it.
Roth Powers, was injured in an automobile collision involving an
1095
State Farm Insurance had the primary obligauninsured driver.
tion to pay any damages resulting from Powers’ injury, up to the
limit of its policy coverage; United Services Automobile Association (“USAA”) was obligated to pay damages that exceeded those
1096
Powers and his wife demanded arbitracovered by State Farm.
1097
After the State
tion with State Farm on the issue of damages.
Farm arbitration, the Powers demanded that USAA pay compensation for the excess damages, but USAA disputed the amount of
damages claimed by the Powers and demanded separate arbitra1098
The court held USAA was not collaterally estopped from
tion.
demanding arbitration of the Powers’ claim because USAA did not
participate in State Farm’s arbitration and had no contractual rela1099
The court also held that, because the
tionship with State Farm.
Powers did not demand that USAA participate or make any effort

1089.
1090.
1091.
1092.
1093.
1094.
1095.
1096.
1097.
1098.
1099.

See id. at 301.
See id. at 302.
See id.
See id. at 304-05.
6 P.3d 294 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 295.
See id.
See id. at 296.
See id.
See id. at 296-97.
See id. at 298.

YIR_FMT.DOC

2001]

04/24/01 12:03 PM

THE YEAR IN REVIEW

161

to consolidate the arbitrations, USAA did not waive its right to arbitration.1100
In West v. Umialik Insurance Co.,1101 the supreme court applied
the doctrine of reasonable expectations to reverse the lower court’s
ruling in favor of an insurer and to remand for entry of summary
judgment for homeowners whose house had settled when soil un1102
der the foundation was eroded by water from broken plumbing.
The insurer justified its original denial of coverage to the homeowners by citing exclusions in their policy for damage caused by
“settling, shrinking, bulging or expansion,” “earth movement,” and
1103
water damage from “water below the surface of the ground.”
The court held that a reasonable person could understand “settling” and “water damage” as referring to exclusively natural or ex1104
The “settling” clause was part of a list of external phenomena.
clusions entailing natural or environmental concerns, justifying the
homeowners’ belief that settling in their policy referred only to that
1105
A provision that the insurer would pay for
caused naturally.
“water damage not otherwise excluded” connoted coverage of
1106
The earth movement exclusion was not
some water damage.
limited to natural events but did not contemplate exclusion for
1107
damage from improvements to the house made by the insured.
The court finally noted that case law interpreting similar provisions
1108
generally covered damage of the sort occurring here.
X. PROPERTY LAW
1109
In Alaska v. United States, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit decided that title to an Alaskan riverbed, which lies
within a tract of land withdrawn from sale in 1943 and made a federal reserve, did not pass from the federal government to the state
upon Alaska’s statehood in 1959 or upon a change in the status of
1110
When the U.S. conveyed
the withdrawn land after statehood.
parts of the riverbed to Alaska Native corporations, the State of
Alaska challenged the conveyances in federal district court, claim1100.
1101.
1102.
1103.
1104.
1105.
1106.
1107.
1108.
1109.
1110.

See id.
8 P.3d 1135 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 1138.
See id. at 1137.
See id. at 1140-43.
See id. at 1139.
See id. at 1142.
See id.
See id. at 1139.
213 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2000).
See id. at 1098.
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ing that, because the river was navigable, the State acquired title
upon statehood.1111 The circuit court certified two questions: (1)
whether Congress intended to defeat the passage of title to submerged lands, including the riverbed, to the state on the date of
statehood; and (2) assuming that Congress did intend to defeat the
passage of title, whether the submerged lands passed to the state
1112
The
when the withdrawal order was revoked after statehood.
circuit court held that the Alaska Statehood Act acknowledged the
authority of the federal government to exercise the power of exclusive legislation over tracts of land held before statehood by the U.S
for military purposes, and that the U.S. acquires title upon the ex1113
The court noted that the exclusive legislaercise of that power.
tion power applied even if only small parts of the withdrawn tract
1114
The court also held that,
were being used for military purposes.
pursuant to the Statehood Act, the U.S. lost exclusive legislative
jurisdiction when the withdrawal order was revoked but that this
1115
The court therefore held that
loss did not also cause loss of title.
the U.S. retained title to the riverbed and remanded the case to the
1116
district court for further proceedings.
In Fairbanks North Star Borough Assessor’s Office v. Golden
1117
the supreme court held that the reversionary
Heart Utilities,
method, used to value Golden Heart’s possessory interest of the
Fairbanks downtown utilidor system, was a “recognized and ap1118
The reversionary method “espropriate method of valuation.”
timates the value of a leasehold interest by taking the value of the
fee interest of the property and deducting both the value of the
burden of use restrictions imposed by the City and the value of the
1119
The court held the
City’s reversionary interest in the property.”
reversionary method to be an appropriate valuation of a possessory
1120
interest for tax-exempt property, such as the utilidor system.
The court did find, however, that the assessor erred in making a
deduction for use restrictions, because when the property reverts to

1111.
1112.
1113.
1114.
1115.
1116.
1117.
1118.
1119.
1120.

See id. at 1093.
See id. at 1098.
See id. at 1094-95.
See id.
See id. at 1097.
See id. at 1098.
13 P.3d 263 (Alaska 2000).
Id. at 265.
Id. at 265-66.
See id. at 272.
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the City, it will not contain these restrictions.1121 The court found
1122
no equal protection or due process violations.
1123
In Kottke v. Parker, the supreme court upheld the admission
of Kottke’s will to formal probate despite claims of undue influ1124
ence and insane delusions in the writing of the will. The supreme
court found that Parker’s presence during the revision of a will did
not create undue influence and that Kottke’s false belief that his
first wife’s children had stolen from him was not an insane delu1125
The will, which Kottke had revised after his first wife’s
sion.
death and after discovering he had prostate cancer, left the major1126
The children of Kottke’s first
ity of Kottke’s estate to Parker.
wife claimed that, when Kottke rewrote his will, Parker had exerted an undue influence on him and he had suffered insane delu1127
Because “the trial
sions that the children had stolen from him.
court made an exemplary inquiry and specifically addressed each
factual contention raised,” the supreme court upheld the finding
1128
The supreme court
that Parker did not exert undue influence.
recognized that the superior court considered a number of factors,
including the fact that Parker was not the sole beneficiary, Parker
did not participate substantially in the writing of the will, and Kot1129
Additionally, the supreme court found
tke did not act hastily.
that, because Kottke had a factual basis for the belief that the children had stolen from him, he did not suffer insane delusions; thus,
1130
“The supehis will was not affected by these alleged delusions.
rior court properly found that the facts urged by [the children] did
1131
not support theories of undue influence or insane delusions.”
1132
In Laverty v. Alaska Railroad Corp., the supreme court upheld the superior court’s decision that injunctive relief against the
Alaska Railroad Corporation (“ARRC”) under the Public Notice
1133
ARRC entered into a contract
Clause was barred by laches.
1134
with Flamingo Brothers for removal of gravel from ARRC land.
1121.
1122.
1123.
1124.
1125.
1126.
1127.
1128.
1129.
1130.
1131.
1132.
1133.
1134.

See id. at 272.
See id. at 274.
6 P.3d 243 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 244.
See id. at 247.
See id. at 244-45.
See id. at 245.
Id.
See id. at 247-48.
See id. at 246-47.
Id. at 247.
13 P.3d 725 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 738.
See id. at 728.
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The court found that ARRC’s land was state land, therefore, it was
subject to the Public Notice Clause before it was disposed of.1135
The court also found that when ARRC made a contract with Fla1136
In
mingo Brothers, ARRC disposed of an interest in the land.
addition, despite the applicability of the Public Notice Clause,
1137
The court reARRC did not provide adequate prior notice.
versed the lower court’s finding on notice, necessitating a remand
for entry of a declaratory judgment in favor of Laverty, as well as
1138
an award of attorneys’ fees for Laverty.
1139
In Simon v. State, the supreme court affirmed the superior
court decision that Public Land Order (“PLO”) 1613 allowed
Alaska to do subsurface work or lower the elevation of the Glenn
1140
The Simons filed suit against the State of Alaska and
Highway.
Quality Asphalt Paving, arguing that the easement granted by PLO
1613 only allowed the State to make improvements on the existing
highway and did not allow the State to expand it or alter its
1141
Because PLO 1613 contained ambiguous language recourse.
garding the scope of the easement, reasonably necessary changes to
1142
The supreme court held that the superior
the land were allowed.
court’s determination that the changes were reasonably necessary
1143
was not clearly erroneous.
1144
In Snook v. Bowers, the supreme court affirmed both a superior court decision that the Bowerses were the sole owners of
property and a denial of Snook’s motion for relief from a stipulated
1145
Prior to 1984,
judgment regarding ownership of the property.
the property belonged to the Shaan-Seet Native Corporation (the
“Corporation”), but in 1984, the Corporation conveyed the property to “the heirs and devisees of James Snook, who died October
1146
These heirs then sold the property to the Bowerses
23, 1973.”
who, upon payment of earnest money, began developing the
1147
Later investigation by a title insurance company revealed
land.
that James Snook had a brother, Russell, who had died before
1135.
1136.
1137.
1138.
1139.
1140.
1141.
1142.
1143.
1144.
1145.
1146.
1147.

See id. at 731.
See id.
See id. at 738.
See id.
996 P.2d 1211 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 1214-15.
See id. at 1213.
See id.
See id.
12 P.3d 771 (Alaska 2000).
See id.
Id.
See id. at 775.
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James.1148 The heirs of James Snook then blamed Shaan-Seet for
the confusion, and Shaan-Seet filed an interpleader naming all of
1149
The matter ended in a stipulation, which
the potential heirs.
1150
At the same time, Snook
Snook sought unsuccessfully to amend.
had also filed a complaint against the Bowerses to cancel their purchase of the property, and the trial court granted summary judg1151
ment to the Bowerses.
The supreme court found that the trial court properly denied
Snook’s motion to amend the stipulation finding that the motion
1152
did not present an extraordinary circumstance justifying relief.
The supreme court also upheld the grant of summary judgment for
1153
Additionally, the court found that the payment of
the Bowerses.
earnest money gave the Bowerses equitable title and that they
gained title to any remaining interests in the property through ad1154
The property involved was not exempted from
verse possession.
adverse possession by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
1155
because, as a subdivision, it was considered developed land.
1156
In Winther v. Gainhart Samuelson, the supreme court held
that fishing rights cannot be sold as part of a partnership under a
state law claim after federal courts had already determined that no
fishing rights accrued to the partnership, and that the statute of
frauds barred enforcement of any alleged contract for the fishing
1157
John
rights, because the alleged contract was not in writing.
Winther, Douglas Eaton, and Bud Samuelson owned a vessel, the
F/V Prowler, as tenants-in-common according to an ownership
1158
After Samuelson sold his interest in the vessel to the
agreement.
other two in 1989, new fishing regulations allocated quota shares
(“IFQ shares”) to those individuals who owned vessels in order to
regulate the amount of fish that were removed from the Alaska
1159
Former partners of dissolved partnerships were eligible for
sea.
1160
A federal court upheld an administrative ruling
the IFQ shares.
that the parties had owned the vessel as individuals not as a part1148.
1149.
1150.
1151.
1152.
1153.
1154.
1155.
1156.
1157.
1158.
1159.
1160.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 776.
See id. at 777.
See id. at 779.
See id. at 780.
10 P.3d 1167 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 1173.
See id. at 1168.
See id. at 1169.
See id.
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nership and, therefore, Samuelson was entitled to one-third of the
IFQ shares.1161 The supreme court held that because the federal
court had already determined Samuelson’s IFQ shares belonged to
him as an individual, the shares never accrued to the partnership
interest that Samuelson sold and Winther’s claim to those shares
1162
Furthermore, the court held that
failed as a matter of law.
Alaska Statutes section 45.01.206 barred any claim that Samuelson
sold his IFQ shares in an alleged separate transaction because the
shares were worth more than 5,000 dollars and the alleged transac1163
tion was not evidenced in writing.
XI. TORT LAW
In Anderson v. Tuboscope Vetco, Inc.,1164 the court affirmed
summary judgment for the defendant, Tuboscope Vetco, against
1165
Anderson was a temthe tort claims of a temporary employee.
porary employee provided by Olsten, a temporary employment
1166
Anderson was injured during his employment at Tucompany.
1167
The court held that
boscope while performing his job duties.
Tuboscope was immune from tort liability under the Exclusive
1168
Remedy Provision of the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act.
The court held that temporary employees are “employees of the
employer for workers’ compensation purposes as a matter of
1169
Tuboscope was a special employer for workers’ compensalaw.”
tion purposes, because the three criteria were met: “(a) the employee has made a contract of hire, express or implied with the special employer; (b) the work being done is essentially that of the
special employer; and (c) the special employer has the right to con1170
trol the details of the work.”
1171
In Grant v. Stoyer, the supreme court held that, where negligence and causation of physical injury resulting from a car accident
are conceded or proved and there is substantial evidence indicating
1172
On Desome pain and suffering, the jury must award damages.
1161.
1162.
1163.
1164.
1165.
1166.
1167.
1168.
1169.
1170.
1171.
1172.

See id. at 1170.
See id. at 1171.
See id. at 1171-73.
9 P.3d 1013 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 1020.
See id. at 1015.
See id. at 1016.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 1017.
10 P.3d 594 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 598.
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cember 19, 1994, Stoyer drove her car into Grant’s car at an intersection.1173 Grant complained of pain in her chest, shoulder, back,
and knee, both to the paramedics who arrived at the scene of the
1174
Grant
accident and to the emergency room admitting nurse.
subsequently received additional medical treatment and physical
1175
Stoyer conceded
therapy and underwent two shoulder surgeries.
that she had been negligent, and thus the case went to trial only on
1176
The jury found that
the questions of causation and damages.
Stoyer’s negligence did not cause Grant’s damages, and therefore
1177
Bedetermined Grant should not receive any damage award.
cause she immediately complained of injury and sustained ongoing
treatment, “the jury had no evidentiary basis for finding that the
1178
accident had caused no compensable injury to Grant.” The court
reversed the superior court judgment and remanded Grant’s dam1179
ages claim for a new trial.
In Guerrero v. Alaska Housing Finance Corp.,1180 the supreme
court held that the plaintiff’s complaint, which alleged that the
Housing Finance Corporation negligently breached its duty to a
minor who was struck by a car, was legally sufficient to withstand a
Civil Rule 12(b)(6) motion, because the complaint alleged some
potentially non-discretionary functions under circumstances re1181
Five-year-old Alexanquiring defendants to exercise due care.
der Guerrero was struck by a car and severely injured as he attempted to cross a dangerous intersection outside his family’s
1182
Overturning the lower court’s Rule
apartment complex.
12(b)(6) dismissal, the supreme court found that Guerrero’s conduct in crossing the street where no crosswalk existed did not absolve the defendant of the duty it owed him, but rather would
“bear on the jury’s determination of negligence, breach, causation,
1183
Furthermore, since it is not clear from the comand damages.”
plaint that the landlord’s duty was “vastly narrower than the duty
alleged by Guerrero,” dismissing the complaint under Rule

1173.
1174.
1175.
1176.
1177.
1178.
1179.
1180.
1181.
1182.
1183.

See id. at 595.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 594.
See id. at 596.
Id. at 597.
See id. at 600.
6 P.3d 250 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 252.
See id.
Id. at 255.
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12(b)(6) amounted to error.1184 Finally, it was not clear beyond
doubt that all the complaints against the defendant were barred by
the discretionary function immunity provision of Alaska Statutes
1185
Despite finding that the corporation was an
section 09.50.250(1).
instrumentality of the State for purposes of claiming sovereign im1186
munity, the supreme court held that at least one of Guerrero’s
complaints could fall within the rubric of “operation acts,” thus
precluding Alaska Statutes section 09.50.250(1)’s discretionary
1187
function immunity defense, and precluding a 12(b)(6) dismissal.
1188
In Hutton v. Realty Executives, Inc., the supreme court held
that, as a matter of law, constructive knowledge does not necessarily begin the running of the statute of limitations in claims of misrepresentation or breach of professional duty where the subject of
constructive knowledge is the same subject about which there is an
1189
In 1992, the
alleged professional duty to advise the plaintiff.
Huttons purchased a nine-unit property from the State, which was
1190
The Huttons
represented by Realty Executives, Inc. (“Realty”).
discovered in 1997 that the property violated zoning regulations,
and filed suit against Realty in 1999 for negligent misrepresentation
and breach of professional duty for failing to notify the Huttons of
1191
the zoning regulations. Because seven years had passed since the
sale of the property, the trial court granted Realty’s motion to dis1192
Under the discovery rule
miss on statute of limitations grounds.
adopted by the supreme court, the statute of limitations does not
begin to run until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have
1193
Realty argued
discovered the facts creating his cause of action.
that the Huttons had constructive knowledge of the law and should
have known of the zoning violations on the date of the sale, trig1194
However, the supreme court
gering the statue of limitations.
held that constructive knowledge cannot be used to preclude
causes of action arising out of a professional relationship where the
plaintiff relied on the professional to convey knowledge, and the
professional in turn claimed that the plaintiff had constructive

1184.
1185.
1186.
1187.
1188.
1189.
1190.
1191.
1192.
1193.
1194.

Id. at 258.
See id. at 258-64.
See id. at 259.
See id. at 264.
14 P.3d 977 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 981.
See id. at 979.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 980.
See id. at 979.
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knowledge.1195 As a result, the question of when the Huttons
should have known of the zoning problem and when the statute of
1196
Therefore, the supreme
limitations began was a question of fact.
court reversed the lower court’s motion to dismiss and remanded
1197
the case for further proceedings.
In In re Exxon Valdez Icicle Seafoods, Inc.,1198 the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that an agreement to
“cede” back punitive damages was lawful and that the plaintiff was
not required to disclose the existence of such an agreement to the
1199
This case arose out of the
jury determining punitive damages.
1200
Exxon reached a settlement agree1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill.
1201
The setment with the “Seattle Seven” processors of seafood.
tlement did not release the processors’ claims against Exxon, but it
included an agreement to cede back to Exxon any punitive dam1202
However, because the jury determining the puniages received.
tive damages award was not told of this agreement between Exxon
and the Seattle Seven, the district court determined that the Seattle
Seven could not participate in the allocation of the punitive dam1203
The court of appeals held that cede back agreements are
ages.
enforceable, because they encourage settlement in mass tort
1204
In addition, such agreements should not be revealed to
cases.
the jury, because such disclosure would likely cause the jury to in1205
flate the punitive damages assessed. There were no special circumstances in the case to justify revealing the agreement to the
1206
The district court improperly excluded the Seattle Seven
jury.
1207
from the allocation plan.
In Parks Hiway Enterprises v. CEM Leasing, Inc.,1208 the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment against Parks Hiway on its strict liability, trespass, nuisance,
and negligence claims against the supplier of petroleum to an adjacent landowner whose underground tanks leaked, causing con1195.
1196.
1197.
1198.
1199.
1200.
1201.
1202.
1203.
1204.
1205.
1206.
1207.
1208.

See id. at 980.
See id. at 981.
See id.
229 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2000).
See id. at 800.
See id. at 792.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 795.
See id. at 798.
See id.
See id. at 800.
See id. at 800-01.
995 P.2d 657 (Alaska 2000).
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tamination.1209 The groundwater under the property of Parks Hiway was contaminated by fuel that leaked from underground stor1210
Parks Hiway
age tanks owned by the Gold Hills Service Station.
1211
Because Petrosued the suppliers of the fuel, Petroleum Sales.
leum Sales was not an “owner” or “person having control” of the
fuel, the “operator” of the facility from which the fuel leaked, nor
was it a “transporter,” as defined under Alaska Statutes section
46.03.822, the statute did not extend liability to Petroleum Sales for
contamination that occurred after the sale and delivery of the
1212
The court denied the trespass claim because Petroleum
fuel.
Sales did not own or control the fuel when it leaked into the
groundwater and because it did not “set in motion a force which, in
1213
In
the usual course of events, will damage property of another.”
addition, because Petroleum Sales did not own or control the fuel
or the tanks at the time of contamination, and was not a “substantial factor” in creating the nuisance, it could not be held liable for
1214
Lastly, the court rejected Parks Hiway’s negliprivate nuisance.
gence claim on the ground that, even if the duty to investigate the
tanks only requires constructive knowledge of the defective tanks,
Parks Hiway did not present sufficient evidence to create an issue
1215
of fact on the duty element of negligence.
1216
In Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., the supreme court held that
the 1986 Tort Reform Act modified the definition of comparative
negligence in product liability lawsuits to include ordinary negli1217
Smith was injured when a door on an air compressor
gence.
1218
Smith filed a
manufactured by Ingersoll-Rand fell on his head.
product liability suit against Ingersoll-Rand, which argued that
Smith was comparatively negligent by failing to wear a hard hat
1219
and by unsafely propping open the compressor door. As a result,
the Federal District Court of Alaska certified to the supreme court
the question of whether ordinary negligence is considered com1220
Prior to the
parative negligence in a product liability action.

1209.
1210.
1211.
1212.
1213.
1214.
1215.
1216.
1217.
1218.
1219.
1220.

See id. at 668.
See id. at 659.
See id. at 659-60.
Id. at 660-64.
Id. at 664-65.
See id. at 666-67.
See id. at 667.
14 P.3d 990 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 996.
See id. at 990-91.
See id. at 991.
See id. at 992.
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1986 Act, comparative negligence was only allowed in product liability cases where the plaintiff knew the product was defective but
unreasonably used it, and where the plaintiff misused the product,
1221
However, the 1986 Tort
proximately causing his own injuries.
Reform Act defined fault in relation to comparative negligence as
“acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent, reckless or in1222
Therefore, the court held that the Act expanded the
tentional.”
definition of comparative negligence in product liability actions to
1223
include ordinary negligence.
1224
In State v. Johnson, the supreme court held that the State
only owed a “duty of reasonable care” to an inmate who was
1225
Finding improper the superior
knocked off a stairway landing.
court’s jury instruction requiring the State to exercise the “utmost
caution,” the supreme court reversed and remanded the case for
1226
Inmate Garry Johnson suffered serious infurther proceedings.
juries after being struck by a cell door and knocked off a stairway
1227
Because Johnson “was not ‘in danger’ as contemplated
landing.
1228
by the court in Wilson [v. City of Kotzebue ], the situation did not
permit an instruction more stringent than reasonable and prudent
1229
The court limited the issue on
care under the circumstances.”
remand to “whether the State was negligent in designing and
1230
Furthermore, it indibuilding the stairway to Johnson’s cell.”
cated that the superior court should instruct the jury that a violation of the 1979 building code was evidence of negligence, not neg1231
The 1979 code, adopted before the State
ligence per se.
correctional facility received its building permit, required stairway
landings to measure sixty inches, a foot longer than the landing in
1232
However, prior to Johnson’s accident,
front of Johnson’s cell.
the State and City had adopted the 1991 building code, which only
1233
required the landing to be forty-four inches. Because the landing
complied with the 1991 code at the time of the accident, the court
found that the appropriate instructions should allow the jury either
1221.
1222.
1223.
1224.
1225.
1226.
1227.
1228.
1229.
1230.
1231.
1232.
1233.

See id. at 993.
Id. at 994.
See id. at 996.
2 P.3d 56 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 61.
See id. at 60-61.
See id. at 58.
627 P.2d 623 (Alaska 1981).
Johnson, 2 P.3d at 61.
Id.
See id. at 63.
See id. at 58.
See id. at 58-59.
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to accept or reject the 1979 code violation as evidence of negligence.1234
In Trombley v. Starr-Wood Cardiac Group,1235 the supreme
court reversed in part and affirmed in part summary judgment
granted to the defendants for claims arising out of a medical mal1236
Mrs. Trombley accused the defendants of operatpractice case.
ing on the wrong artery during a cardiac bypass and using veins
1237
Her husband joined suit, claiming loss
taken from the wrong leg.
1238
The court sustained summary judgment with reof consortium.
spect to Mr. Trombley’s claim, since Mrs. Trombley was married to
1239
The court reversed summary
another man during the operation.
judgment against Mrs. Trombley, however, because the testimonies
of an expert witness and the defendant raised sufficient evidence of
an issue of material fact as to the claims of mistake, negligence, and
1240
causation.
Jonathan M. Werner*

1234.
1235.
1236.
1237.
1238.
1239.
1240.

See id. at 64.
3 P.3d 916 (Alaska 2000).
See id. at 918.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 923.
See id. at 921.

* The Editor wishes to thank Nell Scott and the authors of The 2000 Year in
Review: Heather Bell, Peter Bogue, Christine Chobot, Sarah Dylag, Erin Foley,
Denali Kemppel, David Kim, Christina Lewis, Jennifer Merzon, Eric Spencer,
Robert Tally, and Jennifer Tomsen.
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APPENDIX
CASES OMITTED FROM THE 2000 YEAR IN REVIEW
ADMINISTRATIVE
Kozulin v. INS, 218 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2000)
(denying Kozulin’s petition for review of a denial of his asylum
petition).

Prowler Partnership v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 242 F.3d
383 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that two vessels used by the National Marine Fisheries
Service to conduct a scientific research study were “scientific research vessels” within the meaning of the Magnuson Fishery
Conservation and Management Act).

CIVIL PROCEDURE
Cole v. Bartels, 4 P.3d 956 (Alaska 2000)
(affirming the superior court award of prejudgment interest on
the compensatory award and enhanced fees to the appellee).

Preblich v. Zorea, 996 P.2d 730 (Alaska 2000)
(holding that a plaintiff’s malpractice claim was barred because
the six-year statute of limitations had elapsed).

Hymes v. Alaska State Troopers, No. 00-35232, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 24036, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 11, 2000)
(holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when
it denied Hymes’ motion for reconsideration and dismissed his
action after Hymes failed to show clear error or present new evidence).

Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, 220 F.3d 1134
(9th Cir. 2000)
(dismissing a First Amendment challenge mounted by a group of
landlords in opposition to Alaska’s housing laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of marital status).

CRIMINAL LAW
State v. Blackmore, 2 P.3d 644 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that in the absence of legislative prohibition, the Alaska
Board of Game retains its common law power to enact regulations declaring any violators strictly liable, so long as punishments remain non-criminal).

Billy v. State, 5 P.3d 888 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000)
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(affirming Billy’s conviction and holding that Billy’s attorney’s
mistakes were not so egregious as to constitute ineffective counsel).

Blank v. State, 3 P.3d 359 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000)
(reversing Blank’s conviction because the portable breath test
administered to Blank by the police constituted an unauthorized
search).

Brown v. State, 12 P.3d 201 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000)
(affirming Brown’s sentence despite his argument that the state
missed the filing deadline for aggravating factors).

Cano v. Anchorage, No. A-7243, No. 4225, 2000 Alaska App.
LEXIS 80, at *1 (June 7, 2000)
(holding it was not an abuse of discretion for a lower court judge
to deny Cano, who was convicted of trespass, jury instructions on
necessity and waiver, and the opportunity to give the final argument in his capacity as co-counsel).

Carter v. State, No. A-7085, No. 4233, 2000 Alaska App. LEXIS 85,
at *1 (June 21, 2000)
(holding that a sexual assault victim’s identification of her assailant while he was in handcuffs was not unreliable, and that the
composite sentence of forty-five years was not excessive).

Castle v. State, 999 P.2d 169 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that the police stop that lead to the discovery of evidence used to convict Castle was illegal).

Clark v. Anchorage, 2 P.3d 639 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000)
(dismissing Clark’s appeal for want of jurisdiction).

Haruch v. State, No. A-7253, No. 4232, 2000 Alaska App. LEXIS
84, at *1 (June 21, 2000)
(holding that the trial judge was not clearly mistaken when he
adjusted Haruch’s five-year presumptive sentence to twenty
years with ten years suspended because Haruch’s crime was a
“worst offense”).

Ivanoff v. State, 9 P.3d 294 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that the record did not support a probable cause finding
for a search warrant for Ivanoff’s home).

Jensen v. State, No. A-7471, No. 4228, 2000 Alaska App. LEXIS
88, at *1 (June 21, 2000)
(holding that Jensen may not appeal as excessive a judge’s sentence pursuant to a plea agreement that doesn’t exceed that plea
agreement by two years).

Johnson v. State, No. A-7264, No. 4258, 2000 Alaska App. LEXIS
110, at *1 (August 9, 2000)
(holding that an arrest on an outstanding traffic warrant was not
a pretext to search the defendant, and that the officer’s discovery
of a crack pipe in the defendant’s pocket created sufficient prob-
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able cause to justify opening the defendant’s small box which
contained cocaine).

Kingsley v. State, 11 P.3d 1001 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that the state showed Kingsley had control over his motor vehicle while intoxicated, and that the trial judge did not
need to instruct the jury on the issue of operability).

Malloy v. State, 1 P.3d 1266 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000)
(affirming Malloy’s convictions but directing the superior court
to delete the restriction on her eligibility for discretionary parole).

Markgraf v. State, 12 P.3d 197 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that a lay witness may state in court that another person
seemed scared).

Morrison v. State, 7 P.3d 955 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000)
(defining the proper procedure for sentencing when there is a
disagreement between a single-sentencing judge and a threejudge sentencing panel).

Pierre v. State, No. A-7569, No. 4324, 2000 Alaska App. LEXIS
202, at *1 (Dec. 20, 2000)
(holding that Pierre’s case needed to be remanded to the trial
court to determine whether it considered Pierre to be a statutory
“worst offender”).

Powell v. State, 12 P.2d 1187 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that letters written by Powell did not meet the elements
of the crimes of coercion or third-degree assault, reversing the
superior and district court’s judgments).

Schlagel v. State, 13 P.3d 275 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that the trial court erred when it held that Schlagel
failed to demonstrate the first in time defense).

Schoenthaler v. State, No. A-7101, No. 4236, 2000 Alaska App.
LEXIS 96, at *1 (June 28, 2000)
(reversing Schoenthaler’s conviction on the grounds that he was
arrested without probable cause, and that evidence obtained as a
result of the illegal arrest was admitted at trial).

Shewfelt v. Alaska, 228 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that Shewfelt’s absence during the replaying of his testimony, although violative of the Sixth Amendment, was harmless error).

Wilson v. State, 12 P.3d 210 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that the trial court should have disclosed appropriate
parts of a search warrant application and in camera testimony to
Wilson, allowing Wilson to challenge the search warrant).

Wood v. State, A-7592, No. 4261, 2000 Alaska App. LEXIS 113, at
*1 (Aug. 9, 2000)
(holding that the trial court did not err when it imposed Wood’s
full suspended sentence after revoking his probation).
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Workman v. State, No. A-7357, No. 4230, 2000 Alaska App.
LEXIS 83, at *1 (June 21, 2000)
(holding that a composite sentence of four years and one month
for a defendant with four felony convictions and several misdemeanor convictions was not excessive, given the totality of the
defendant’s conduct and record).

FAMILY LAW
Child Support Enforcement Division v. Maxwell, 6 P.3d 733
(Alaska 2000)
(holding that CSED denied Maxwell a fair and meaningful opportunity to deny its presumption of paternity).

